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ZONING AWAY FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Zoning, important as it is within limits, is too rapidly becoming
a legalized device to prevent property owners from doing
whatever their neighbors dislike .... The security and repose
which come from protection of the right to be different in
matter of aesthetics, taste, thought, [and] expression... are not
to be cast aside without violating constitutional privileges and
immunities.'
The Court must never forget that the consequences of
rigorously enforcing the guarantees of the First Amendment
are frequently unpleasant. Much speech that seems to be of
little or no value will enter the marketplace of ideas,
threatening the quality of our social discourse and, more
generally, the serenity of our lives. But that is the price to be
paid for constitutional freedom.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Supreme Court gave zoning its constitutional stamp
of approval in the 1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., zoning has soared in importance as a land use control device.4
All major cities in the United States, except Houston, and most
smaller city and county governments have seized the opportunity to
control their community's quality of life through local land use
regulation.5 States uniformly have delegated to local government
units, or in some cases to regional bodies, the police power to control
land use in order to promote public health, safety, welfare, and
morals. 6 Local officials have balanced the interests of establishing
1. People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272,278 (N.Y. 1963) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
2. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 88 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. See Young, 427 U.S. at 74 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Zoning has become an accepted
necessity in our increasingly urbanized society.").
5. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.01, at I (3d ed. 1993).
6. See Robert C. Ellickson. Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 692 (1973). Before the Court's 1926
decision in Euclid, 368 municipalities employed zoning ordinances. See id. Four years after the
Euclid decision, that number had swelled to over one thousand. See id. By 1967, more than nine
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and preserving their community's desire for healthy, peaceful, and
beautiful surroundings with the economic pressures of growth and the
need for an adequate revenue base. Unfortunately, important
constitutional rights have been compromised by local efforts to
control landowners' use of property in the belief "that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean."7
"Regulatory takings," "exclusionary zoning," "inclusionary
zoning," and "growth controls" are just some of the phrases that have
developed as a result of constitutional clashes involving Fifth
Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause
rights. First Amendment rights9 also have suffered due to the
nation's embrace of zoning as the vehicle of choice in the pursuit of
America's dream community.' 0 Although this author is not yet
prepared to accept in its entirety the common law property rights
system, or so-called "laissez faire distribution of property rights, '
this Article will attempt "to clip the wings of zoning authorities' 12 in
the area of First Amendment rights.'
3
Tapering local government regulation in First Amendment
territory is particularly crucial in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions that threaten to eviscerate constitutional concepts of free
speech and free exercise of religion by ignoring constitutional
protections against content-neutral infringements on First
thousand municipalities wielded zoning authority, and by 1973, nearly 97% of all cities with a
population greater than five thousand had added zoning to their police power arsenal. See id.
7. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
8. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S.Ct. 1659 (1997); Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1
(1988); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
10. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding content-neutral,
generally applicable regulations); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1985) (approving
a "secondary effects" analysis).
11. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 684.
12. Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong With Euclid, 5
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 277,290-91 (1996).
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Amendment rights. 14 Some Justices' recent positions on this issue
clash with the older view that there exists "a deep tradition in First
Amendment law that government may not escape scrutiny of its
attempts to suppress speech merely by labeling its action as neutral
regulation; it is the operation and effect of government action, not its
form, that matters."' 5 The contrary position, championed by Justice
Scalia, disregards burdens placed on First Amendment rights by
generally applicable, content-neutral regulations, and is an open call
to local officials to implement, without reproach, the local
community's concept of creating "a sanctuary for people,"' 6 at the
expense of property rights and minority viewpoints.' 7 Somewhat
ironically, Justice Scalia expressed concern in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council 8 that state legislators "must do more than
proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses [a landowner]
desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory
assertion that they violate a common-law maxim such as sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas."'19 This concern applies with equal, if not
greater, force to land use decisions impacting First Amendment
rights.20 "Instead, as [they] would be required to do if [they] sought to
restrain [a landowner] in a common-law action for public
nuisance,[ 21] [local officials] must identify background principles of
14. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572-81 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that laws affecting free speech will implicate the First Amendment only if such laws
represent an attempt to suppress speech); Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (stating that laws which
infringe on religious practices will not violate the First Amendment unless such laws represent
an attempt to regulate religious practices); see also Elliott Mincberg. A Look at Recent Supreme
Court Decisions. Judicial Prior Restraint and the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGs L.J. 871, 875
(1993) (stating that Justice Scalia's theory that the First Amendment does not apply to
legislative actions not intended to affect free speech rights "is an extremely dangerous view that
ignores the special status of religion, speech, and the press under the First Amendment").
15 G. & A. Books, Inc. v. Stem, 604 F. Supp. 898, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U S. 697, 708 (1931)), affd, 770 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1985).
16 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
17. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872 (Scalia, J., delivering the majority opinion).
18. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
19 Id. at 1031.
20 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (noting that "[flreedom of
press, freedom of speech, [and] freedom of religion are in a preferred position" to economic
interests); see also id. at 121 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("None of the provisions of our Constitution
is more venerated by the people or respected by legislatures and the courts than those which
proclaim for our country the freedom of religion and expression.").
21. Note that the declaration that a particular use is a public nuisance has been deemed a
19981
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nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses [the landowner]
intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently
found. 22 Some may argue that background principles of nuisance
law would not prohibit, for example, a landowner from building a
house on his or her own property, but would prohibit pornography or
nude dancing. However, just as local officials historically have used
public nuisance statutes to protect flood plains, the First Amendment
historically has protected pornographic and adult activities.23
To facilitate the tapering of local government regulation, this
Article proposes that, as a matter of constitutional policy, the courts'
should analyze zoning as a prior restraint when the challenged
regulation has the potential to impact First Amendment rights.24
Zoning actions invalidated by the Court as prior restraints can then be
adjudicated as common law nuisance actions that address those actual
harms caused by the alleged offending land use activities.
Admittedly, this proposal turns current constitutional jurisprudence
"on its head." However, if courts can use "secondary effects" 25 to
give less protection to "lower-level" forms of expression, such as
adult uses and commercial visual blight, then why shouldn't courts
use the doctrine of prior restraint to give an extra level of protection
to "higher-level" First Amendment rights, such as religious exercise?
Resolving the conflict between First Amendment rights and
government's fundamental concerns of "public health and safety,
public peace and order, defense," 26 and revenue-raising requires
prior restraint. See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 (1980) (deeming a
prior restraint a Texas statute that designated as a public nuisance the display of any films by an
adult theatre that had formerly displayed obscene films). Therefore, any action for nuisance,
either private or public, must be brought only after the offending conduct has occurred.
22. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
23. See Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28
IND. L. REV. 329, 344-52 (1995); see also. Janis Searles, Sexually Explicit Speech and
Feminism, 63 REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO 471, 475 (1994) (analyzing
First Amendment protection for pornography, and adult or erotic establishments).
24. This Article will focus on the First Amendment rights of religious exercise, freedom
of speech and expression, and freedom of association. This Article does not address the
Establishment Clause.
25. "Secondary effects" is the phrase used to describe those unwanted activities at which
government regulation is aimed to justify the restriction of First Amendment rights. See infra
notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
26. J. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327,
330-31 (1969); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 910 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
(Vol. 53:1
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careful balancing.27 While the government traditionally has great
latitude in land use planning,28 in a clash between government
regulation and constitutional rights, the courts, and indeed regulating
governments, must give ample weight to those rights protected by the
Bill of Rights. 9 Indeed, some advocate that where a conflict exists
dissenting); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) ("Mere legislative preferences
or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at
other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights
so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and
difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality
of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.").
27. Benjamin Franklin once said, "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMOUS
QUOTATIONS 227 (Morley & Everett eds., 1951).
28. See G. & A. Books, Inc. v. Stem, 604 F. Supp. 898, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("it has long
been settled that the political branches of government have broad latitude in land use planning")
(citing Berman v Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)), affd, 770 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1985); see also
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.. 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) ("[A] city's interest in
attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.").
29 See West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). The Barnette
Court stated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections.
Id, see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 728 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Only an especially important governmental interest pursued by narrowly
tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms as the price for an
equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens."); 815 Foxon Road,
Inc. v. Town of East Haven, 605 F. Supp. 1511, 1516 (D. Conn. 1985) ("Municipalities may
regulate land use, but they may not regulate the exercise of First Amendment rights.") (citing
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977)); G. & A. Books, Inc., 604 F. Supp.
at 901 (stating that deference to local govemment for planning and achieving land use goals
"must give way in the face of a substantial claim of infringement on a constitutionally protected
right"); id. at 908 (stating that "the traditional deference which federal courts must accord to
legislative and executive judgments regarding land use is inappropriate when First Amendment
Values are implicated") (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), and
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 (1954)). But see Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U S 490, 550 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I believe a community has the right to decide
that its interests in protecting property from damaging trespasses and in securing beautiful
surroundings outweigh the countervailing interests in uninhibited expression by means of words
and pictures in public places."); Young, 427 U.S. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring). In his
concurrence in Young, Powell argued that while
no aspect of the police power enjoys immunity from searching constitutional scrutiny,
it also is undeniable that zoning, when used to preserve the character of specific areas
1998]
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between the police power and First Amendment rights, the
constitutional considerations must outweigh the fundamental right of
a community to protect the public good.
The conflict between zoning and First Amendment rights has been
particularly troublesome to resolve because of the factual settings in
which these conflicts have arisen. For example, many of the zoning
activities that have generated free speech concerns have involved
nude dancing, adult movies or bookstores, and commercial blight,
such as billboards and advertising pamphlets. Admittedly, it would be
a difficult decision to march our children "off to war to preserve the
... right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters
of our choice.",3' Nevertheless, the issue in the zoning context is
whether or not we will permit such a theater to be located in our
community. This author appreciates the opportunity to live in a
community unafflicted by visual blight, but does not wish to have
local officials threaten or restrict either her First Amendment3 2 or
Fifth Amendment33 rights in order to achieve such a community.
Clashes between zoning authorities and religious uses have also
become more prevalent as our society has moved from a relatively
homogeneous Christian society to a community that encompasses
diverse religious beliefs. As our religious base has diversified, local
authorities have increased the "content-neutral" prohibitions against
religious exercise in the community.34 Nevertheless, as members of a
of a city, is perhaps "the most essential function performed by local government, for it
is one of the primary means by which we protect that sometimes difficult to define
concept of quality of life."
Id. (quoting Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
30. See, e.g., Schad, 452 U.S. at 77 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[The] presumption of
validity that traditionally attends a local government's exercise of its zoning powers carries
little, if any, weight where the zoning regulation trenches on rights of expression protected
under the First Amendment."); St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken,
479 A.2d 935, 938 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) ("Regardless of how the City's zoning
ordinance is construed, a municipality may not exercise its zoning power in violation of the
fundamental tenets of the First Amendment."); American Friends of the Soc'y of St. Pius, Inc.
v. Schwab, 417 N.Y.S.2d 991, 994 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
31. Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
32. For example, local officials should not have the power to deny a citizen the right to
conduct a weekly Bible class in her home.
33. For example, local officials should not have the power to prohibit a citizen from
building a house on her property in order to preserve an aesthetically-pleasing open space zone.
34. Clashes between zoning authorities and religious groups commonly have involved
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democratic society, we must recognize that our commitment to First
Amendment freedoms is tested the most when unpopular, unfamiliar,
distasteful, or obnoxious uses present themselves for protection.
35
Decision-makers, both legislative and judicial, must give First
Amendment rights the high level of deference that they deserve in
zoning conflicts. The same judges that find impermissible under the
Fifth Amendment any legislative action that forces a landowner to
bear the burden of society's determination of what constitutes
beneficial legislation must also be mindful of any legislative action
that impacts, even if unintentionally, the exercise of First
Amendment rights.
36
Commentators generally accept that the Court's decision to
uphold the constitutionality of zoning in Euclid37 was motivated, to a
large extent, by the economic and quality-of-life advantages that
inhere to the privileged class of single-family homeowners through
their ability to obviate nuisance-like activities by controlling land
use.31 Justice Sutherland, initially an opponent of the governmental
Jehovah's Witnesses. Orthodox Jews, and Hari Krishnas. See, e.g., Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v.
City of Starkville, 840 F 2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's
Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood. 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983); Columbus Park
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Chicago, 182 N.E.2d 722
(111. 1962); Bethel Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Village of Morton, 559 N.E.2d 533 (III.
App 1990); Allendale Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Grosman, 152 A.2d 569 (N.J.
1959), Burlington Assem. of God Church v. Zoning Bd. of Florence, 570 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super.
Ct Law Div. 1989); Lakewood Residents Assoc. v. Congregation Zichron Schneur, 570 A.2d
1032 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989); Jehovah's Witnesses v. Woolwich Township, 537 A.2d
1336 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. 1988); Apostolic Holiness Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
Babylon, 633 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N Y. App. Div. 1995).
35 See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
US. I, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that
the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must
he accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we
cherish."); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[lf there is any pnnciple of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than
any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate."), overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61
(1946); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 447 (2d
Cir 1981) ("The unpopular traditions, practices, and doctrines of alien religions need not
receive our approval or support, but must be tolerated if our freedoms are to be preserved.").
36. See. e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Pennell v.
City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15-24 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
38. See SEYMOUR TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 196-97 (1969); Kenneth Baar, The National
1998]
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regulation of property rights, delivered the decision that paved the
way for the proliferation of local zoning ordinances. 39 His statements
that "very often the apartment house is a mere parasite," 40 and, "[in
some environments,] apartment houses ... come very near to being
nuisances"'4  suggest his aversion to those land uses that were
unfamiliar and threatening to his concept of a residential
neighborhood. In all likelihood, it was Sutherland's anticipation of
nuisances from these "parasites" that motivated him to depart from
his conservative stance against legislative activity.
42
This Article proposes that we return to the fork in the road at the
Euclid signpost and limit or entirely restrict the use of zoning when it
interferes with First Amendment rights beyond a de minimis
amount.43 Instead, courts and regulators should employ the common
law nuisance theory, the ring that Sutherland grabbed to support
proactive zoning authority,44 to reactively control land use activities
involving an exercise of First Amendment rights. This Article does
not suggest that we discontinue zoning regulation in areas affecting
First Amendment rights. Rather, this Article proposes a constitutional
policy of using an analytical framework for zoning regulation that
may effectively achieve the same purpose.45
Movement to Halt the Spread of Multifamily Housing, 1890-1926, 58 J. Am. PLAN. ASS'N 39
(1992); Abigail T. Baker, Book Note, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (1996) (reviewing
Charles M. Haar's book, Suburbs Under Seige: Race, Space and Audacious Judges).
39. See JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE
STATE (195 1).
40. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
41. Id.at 395.
42. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560-61 (1923), overruled by West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). One can only speculate whether the Court's
decision in Euclid would have been different if the zoning scheme operated to exclude
traditional houses of worship from residential areas.
43. But see Kimberly K. Smith, Comment, Zoning Adult Entertainment: A Reassessment
of Renton, 79 CAL. L. REV. 119, 120 (1991) (arguing that "the Supreme Court's relaxed
scrutiny of adult-use zoning ordinances is justified because such regulations pose less risk of
censorship than other types of content-based speech restrictions").
44. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387 ("In solving doubts [as to the justification for using police
power for public welfare), the maxim sic utere tuo tit alienum non laedas which lies at the
foundation of so much of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful
clew.").
45. See Jefferey S. Trachtman, Note, Pornography, Padlocks, and Prior Restraints: The
Constitutional Limits of the Nuisance Power, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1478, 1501 (1983) (noting that
because only extraordinary and compelling state interests that cannot be served by less
[Vol. 53:1
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This new framework requires the use of the doctrine of prior
restraint. Some have viewed this as "a doctrine 'showing signs of
age' and having 'outlived its usefulness."'' 46 The Supreme Court
recently revitalized this doctrine, however, in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of
Dallas47 by invalidating a business licensing scheme as an
unconstitutional prior restraint on protected speech.a8 If zoning
actions, either legislative or administrative, are viewed as prior
restraints when they potentially affect First Amendment rights, they
will be subject to a heavy presumption against constitutionality.49
Such restraints may only be justified if they: (1) fall into one of the
narrowly defined exceptions to the prohibition against prior
restraints; (2) prevent "direct, immediate and irreparable damage";
(3) are the least restrictive means of doing so; and (4) meet required
procedural safeguards.5 ° If a litigant attempts to justify a prior
restraint under this test, a court may apply as it deems appropriate
either a content-based strict scrutiny standard or a content-neutral
time, place, or manner analysis. Use of the prior restraint doctrine
will invalidate many of the zoning actions that courts have allowed to
restrict individuals' First Amendment rights under rational basis and
content-neutral analyses. Moreover, the doctrine will require
communities to use common law nuisance actions to address any
secondary effects that result from disputed uses. 51Part II of this Article discusses the prior restraint doctrine and its
restrictive means will justify prior restraints, a court determination that a government action is a
"'prior restraint[] virtually amounts to a determination of (its] unconstitutionality").
46. Steven Helle, Prior Restraint by the Backdoor: Conditional Rights, 39 VILL. L. REV.
817, 817 (1994) (quoting Jeffrey A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modern
Interpretations, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439, 440 (1987), andNote, Prior Restraint-A Test
ofInvalidit, in Free Speech Cases?, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1006 (1949) [hereinafter A Test
of invalidan,]).
47. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
48. See id. at 229.
49. See Trachtman, supra note 45, at 1501 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
50. See Bemard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 473-74 (5th Cir. 1980), affd, 452 U.S. 89
(1981).
51. See G. & A. Books, Inc. v. Stem, 604 F. Supp. 898, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("It is a deep
tradition in First Amendment law that government may not escape scrutiny of its attempts to
suppress speech merely by labeling its action as neutral regulation; it is the operation and effect
of government action, not its form, that matters.") (citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
U.S. 697, 708 (1931)), aff'd, 770 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1985).
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application to the zoning context. Part III examines the application of
this doctrine to the rights of free speech and expression. Part IV
considers the operation of the prior restraint doctrine as a guard
against infringements of religious exercise, while Part V reviews the
use of the prior restraint doctrine to protect associational rights. Part
VI explores the impact of using a common law nuisance theory
instead of zoning regulations as a means of land use control over
protected First Amendment activities and includes a discussion of
economic theories that support this method of land use control. This
Article concludes by summarizing a proposed approach to land use
control that will require courts and legislatures to put our First
Amendment rights ahead of the majoritarian ideals of "open spaces
and attractive surroundings. 52
II. ZONING ACTIONS AND THE PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE
A. The Prior Restraint Doctrine
The prior restraint doctrine restricts the government from
suppressing expression before it has been communicated, even
though such expression may be subject to punishment after
dissemination. 53 This doctrine finds its roots in sixteenth-century
England where the Crown required royal sponsorship of printing as a
means of restraining access to the medium of printed expression.
54
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in both England and
America, licensing acts served as a system of prior restraint similar to
the system used in sixteenth-century England. Licensing acts
restrained the publication of seditious and heretical books and
52. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
53. See Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 53 (1983) ("Under the prior restraint doctrine, the
government may not restrain a particular expression prior to its dissemination even though the
same expression could be constitutionally subjected to punishment after dissemination.");
William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech,
Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
245, 245 (1982) ("The prior restraint doctrine precludes, except in certain limited
circumstances, state-imposed restraints with respect to the publication of speech.")
54. See Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.




ZONING AWAY FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
pamphlets as well as unlicensed material not approved by the
government printing monopoly.56 For various reasons, this system of
licensing laws dissolved during the eighteenth century, and freedom
of the press assumed the status of a common law or natural right.5 7 It
was in this setting that the Framers drafted and adopted the First
Amendment, which was designed to prevent the development in
America of a prior restraint system such as the licensing acts in
England.5 8
The United States Supreme Court first recognized prior restraint
as a constitutional principle in the 1931 case of Near v. Minnesota ex
rel. Olson.59 In Near, the Court invalidated as a prior restraint a
statute that provided for the "abatement, as a public nuisance, of a
'malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other
periodical."' 6 The Court made clear that its interpretation and
application of the prior restraint doctrine was not based on narrow
historical precedent.61 The Court applied the doctrine to a modem
problem based on the statute's "operation and effect. 62
Unfortunately, the Court did not express clearly its conception of a
prior restraint or provide guidelines as to when the doctrine properly
should be used. As a result, various commentators and judges have
expressed widely varying opinions about when, how, and even
whether the doctrine should be applied.63
56. Seeid. at650-51
57 See id. at 651. Blackstone summarized the law as follows:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists
in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published. Every free man has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the
press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the
consequences of his own temerity.
Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 151-52).
58. See id. at 652.
59 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
60. Id. at 701-02 (quoting 1925 Minn. Laws 285).
61 See Emerson, supra note 54, at 654-55.
62 Id at 655 (quoting Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 U.S. 697,708 (1931)).
63. See, e~g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 51 (1976) (holding
that a city zoning ordinance prohibiting an adult movie theater from locating within one
thousand feet of any two other regulated uses was not a prior restraint); 754 Orange Ave., Inc.
v. City of West Haven 761 F 2d 105 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a zoning ordinance regulating
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Perhaps the most effective approach to understanding the
underpinnings and application of the prior restraint doctrine was
outlined by Thomas Emerson in his 1955 article entitled The
Doctrine of Prior Restraint.64 Professor Emerson concluded that "in a
democratic society, such as ours, a system of prior restraint based
upon executive approval will operate as a greater deterrent to free
expression and cause graver damage to fundamental democratic
rights than a system of subsequent punishment." 65 If prior restraint is
viewed as "not simply an arbitrary historical accident, but a rational
principle of fundamental weight in the application of the First
Amendment," 66 then we may employ such a doctrine as a vibrant
defense against government regulation that constrains our First
Amendment freedoms. Zoning legislatively restricts in advance
activity that may be protected under the First Amendment and, at
times, administratively requires prior approval of First Amendment
exercise in the form of special or conditional use permits. Thus,
zoning regulations that are designed to prevent offenses-such as
secondary effects that rise to the level of a nuisance-are a classic
example of a restraint based upon executive approval, in the form of
zoning action, rather than subsequent punishment, in the form of a
common law nuisance action.
Commentators also have equated the intellectual foundation for
the doctrine against prior restraint with the libertarian principles of:
"(1) distrust of government; (2) acceptance of the risk inherent in
adult bookstores was an unconstitutional prior restraint); Emerson, supra note 54, at 670-71
(advocating application of the rule to all areas of expression, with certain exceptions, to address
dangerous situations arising today from "growing pressures for preventive controls over many
forms of expression"); Helle, supra note 46, at 877 (proposing application of the doctrine to an
explicit ban on abortion counseling at federally funded family planning clinics and lamenting
that "[i]f a Supreme Court majority does not develop an appreciation for the richly nuanced
harmonics of the First Amendment in our constitutional scheme and of the doctrine against
prior restraint in cases of conditioned speech rights, then the doctrine, like Mozart's grave, may
be lost"); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 434 (1983)
(suggesting that "the conventional doctrine of prior restraint should be retired from active
service in First Amendment adjudication"); Smith, supra note 46, at 449 (describing the
doctrine as "showing signs of age"); A Test ofInvalidity, supra note 46, at 1006 (describing the
doctrine as having "outlived its usefulness").
64. Emerson, supra note 54.
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speech; and (3) individual autonomy from government."6 7 The third
principle particularly "reflects the belief of the framers of the
Constitution that exercise of [fundamental personal] rights lies at the
foundation of free government by free men ' 68 and that the restriction
of these rights and liberties should be prevented. Commentators and
courts have debated vigorously the raison d'itre for the prior restraint
doctrine when judicial prior restraints on expression appear to be no
more harmful to First Amendment interests than subsequent
punishment systems. 69 However, as Professor Redish adroitly
concluded, 70 "administrative restraints present problems unique to
prior restraints and therefore should continue to receive the special
disdain of the prior restraint doctrine.",
7 1
According to the Supreme Court, "the term 'prior restraint' is used
'to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur.' 72 General zoning regulations that
forbid certain uses protected by the First Amendment-religious
worship, nude dancing, or adult bookstores-operate as prior
restraints because they regulate constitutionally protected activity in
advance of its occurrence. This Article proposes a constitutional
policy that recognizes the ability of zoning regulation to chill
protected First Amendment activity, but does not expand the prior
restraint doctrine beyond the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
The Court has adopted a broader interpretation of the term "prior
restraint" than was used in English common law, but it continues to
recognize the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent
punishments.73 The policy proposed here also recognizes this
distinction by treating zoning restrictions as prior restraints and
67. Helle, supra note 46, at 835.
68. Id.
69. See Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66
MINN. L. REV. 11, 13-14 (1981) (examining the validity of analogizing injunctions and
administrative licensing systems for purposes of prior restraint analysis); Smith, supra note 46,
at 444-46.
70. Redish, supra note 53, at 90.
71. Id
72. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting M. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03, at 4-14 (1984)).
73. See id. at 553-54.
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substituting nuisance law as a valid subsequent punishment that
incidentally may affect First Amendment rights.
B. Zoning as a Prior Restraint and the Exceptions that Justify
Restraint
Zoning actions, either legislative or administrative, are prior
restraints when they unconstitutionally abridge First Amendment
rights because "the constitutional right to freedom of expression can
be abridged only in the presence of a truly compelling governmental
interest and ... only an independent judicial forum can adequately
decide whether particular expression is unprotected by the First
Amendment." 74 Allowing local governments to prohibit, segregate, or
otherwise designate the proper location of certain land uses, either by
regulation or by special exception, presents the danger of permitting
local officials to discriminate against constitutionally protected
activities by reference to "viewpoint-neutral criteria such as potential
parking, noise, and litter problems,"" particularly when local
officials are inclined to stretch such concepts to disallow a particular
land use that might be controversial and "offensive to the politics or
sensibilities of some citizens. 76 Indeed, in Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim," Chief Justice Burger declared in his dissenting
opinion that "[c]itizens should be free to choose to shape their
community so that it embodies their conception of the 'decent
life.' '7 8 Burger declared that this should be the case even if it means
that certain activities such as gas stations, bookstores, and "surely
live nude shows [] will not be allowed., 79 Burger's statements seem
to contradict directly the concept of protecting fundamental
constitutional rights against majoritarian infringement and, thus,
further illustrate the danger of "content-neutral" zoning
discrimination.
74. Redish, supra note 53, at 77.
75. TJ's South, Inc. v. Town of Lowell, 895 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
(holding that a town ordinance requiring an eating-and-drinking establishment to obtain a
special exception before presenting entertainment is unconstitutional as a prior restraint).
76. Id.
77. 452U.S. 61 (1981).
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Once zoning actions that impact First Amendment rights are
viewed as prior restraints, they come to the courts with a "heavy
presumption" against constitutional validity.80 This presumption
follows from the doctrine's concern with the nature and form of
governmental regulation, rather than the "content or substantive
character of the particular expression."" The doctrine thus prohibits,
or creates a strong presumption against the legality of, schemes that
have the potential to permit suppression of rights protected by the
First Amendment. 82 However, as described in Part I,83 prior restraints
may be constitutional if they: (1) fall into one of the narrowly defined
exceptions to the prohibition; (2) prevent "direct, immediate and
irreparable damage"; (3) are the least restrictive means of doing so;
and (4) meet the required procedural safeguards.84 The exceptions to
the general prohibition against prior restraints were identified by the
Court in the landmark prior restraint case Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson85 and include: "wartime publication of sensitive military
information, obscenity, and 'incitement to acts of violence."' 86 The
Court created an additional potential exception in Nebraska Press
Ass 'n v. Stuart87 for prior restraints that might operate to preserve a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.88 Nevertheless, the
Court in Nebraska Press Ass 'n reaffirmed that "the barriers to prior
restraint remain high and the presumption against its use continues
80. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (citing
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
81 Redish, supra note 53, at 53.
82. See New York State Ass'n of Career Schs. v. State Educ. Dep't, 823 F. Supp. 1096,
1099 (S.D,N.Y. 1993) (citing New York State Ass'n of Career Schs. v. State Educ. Dep't, 749
F. Supp. 1264, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
83 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
84. See Bernard v, Gulf Oil Company, 619 F.2d 459, 473-74 (5th Cir. 1980), afJ'd, 452
U.S 89 (1981).
85. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
86. Laura M. Grover, Casenote, The Twilight Zone of Prior Restraint, 14 HAMLINE L.
REV 379, 385-86 (1991) (quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 716); see also Emerson, supra note 54, at
660-61.
87. 427 U.S 539, 562 (1976).
88 See id. (employing a balancing test to determine whether "the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger") (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S.
494 (1951)), see also LEARNED HAND, THE BILL Op RIGHTs 58-61 (1958).
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intact."89 Courts have maintained such high barriers to prior restraint
by requiring that there be "an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to
the administration of justice"90 and that such threats immediately
imperil society.9'
Even if prior restraints fall into one of the above-described
exceptions and prevent an imminent threat, they must also be
"narrowly drawn and cannot be upheld if reasonable alternatives are
available having a lesser impact on First Amendment freedoms. '92 In
addition, any prior restraint must meet "procedural safeguards
designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. 93 These
safeguards require: (1) that the regulators prove that the affected
rights are unprotected under the First Amendment; (2) that the
restraint is limited to a preservation of the status quo for the shortest
period that comports with sound judicial procedure; and (3) that a
prompt final judicial determination of nonprotection be made. 94
Much of the focus in the application of the prior restraint doctrine
has centered on freedom of expression issues, most likely because of
the doctrine's historical roots in the licensing acts controversy. 95
However, the fundamental principle that "the First Amendment
forbids the Federal Government to impose any system of prior
restraint, with certain limited exceptions, in any area of expression
that is within the boundaries of that Amendment 96 can be applied
with equal force to prior restraints on the free exercise of religion and
89. 427 U.S. at 570.
90. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947); accord Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 385 (1962); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 532 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Whitney v. Califomia,
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Only an emergency can justify
repression."), overrled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
91. See Craig, 331 U.S. at376.
92. CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1975) (citing Carroll v. President and
Comm'r ofPrincess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968)).
93. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,58 (1965).
94. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59. But cf FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S.
215, 228-30 (1990) (distinguishing factually the Freedman case to apply less strict procedural
safeguards).
95. See generally Emerson, supra note 54, at 650-55.
96. Id. at 648 (noting that the same limitations apply to the states "[b]y incorporating the
First Amendment in the Fourteenth").
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the rights of assembly, petition, and association.97 Given the recent
strains on our system of protecting the civil liberties of the American
people 98 and the necessity for religious institutions to respond to the
societal ills of homelessness, drug-abuse, and the disintegration of the
family unit, there never has been a greater need to reaffirm our
commitment to preserving First Amendment freedoms against
unrestrained government regulation.
III. PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The government can abridge freedom of speech99 in two ways.
First, the government may adversely target speech because of its
message or viewpoint. 1°° Alternatively, the government may target
the effect that speech produces, regardless of its message or
viewpoint.101 When the government restricts speech in the first way, a
content-based infringement, the restriction is unconstitutional unless
the government can show that "the message being suppressed poses a
97. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (stating that "a
law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license,
without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is
unconstitutional"); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951). The Niemotko Court,
summarizing previous cases involving unconstrained government discretion over speech and
related activities, stated:
In those cases this Court condemned statutes and ordinances which required that
permits be obtained from local officials as a prerequisite to the use of public places, on
the grounds that a license requirement constituted a prior restraint on freedom of
speech, press and religion, and, in the absence of narrowly drawn, reasonable and
definite standards for the officials to follow, must be invalid.
M.
98. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (holding that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is unconstitutional as applied to state and local
governments).
99. For the purposes of this Article, the term "freedom of speech" will include all
freedoms, other than those relating to religion and association, that are protected from
government interference under the First Amendment. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785 n.2 (2d ed. 1988) (using freedom of speech as shorthand
for these freedoms).
100. See id § 12-2, at 789-90.
101. See id. (referring to these abridgments as "government actions aimed at
communicative impact" and "government actions aimed at noncommunicative impact" having
"adverse effects on communicative opportunity").
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'clear and present danger,' constitutes a defamatory falsehood,"'10 2 or
otherwise falls outside the protection of the First Amendment.
10 3
When the government restricts speech in the second way, a content-
neutral abridgement, the restriction is constitutional "so long as it
does not unduly constrict the flow of information and ideas."'
104
Courts determine on a case-by-case basis whether a restriction of this
second type properly balances the "values of freedom of expression
and the government's regulatory interests." 10 5 In contrast to the
balancing test that courts apply to content-neutral abridgment, courts
take an "absolutist" approach to content-based abridgements,
prohibiting virtually all such instances of abridgment. 10 6 Courts have
adapted this "two track"'1 7 constitutional analysis to zoning cases that
involve First Amendment infringement claims by applying strict
scrutiny1 8 to content-based regulations, 10 9 and the O'Brien test,' 10 the








108. A regulation subjected to strict scrutiny "can be upheld only if it furthers a compelling
governmental interest by the least restrictive means available." Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2429 (1996).
109. See David S. Day, The End of the Public Fortmn Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REV. 143, 148
(1992) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. Crim. Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 117-19 (1991); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Comnierce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-61 (1990);
and Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment,
105 HARV. L. REV. 554,576 (1991)).
110. See United State v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also Andrew E. Forshay,
Note, The First Amendment Becomes a Nuisance, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 191,203 (1987).
111. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
112. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984)
(stating that the O'Brien test is essentially the same standard as that applied to time, place, and
manner restrictions).
113. See Excalibur Group, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 116 F.3d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir.
1997); Kuznich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1982);
Entertainment Concepts, Inc., III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1980); Hart Book
Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 825-26 (4th Cir. 1979); Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New
York State Liquor Auth., 973 F. Supp. 280, 283 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), modified, 134 F.3d 87 (2d
Cir. 1998); Wilson v. City of Louisville, 957 F. Supp. 948, 951 (W.D. Ky. 1997); Purple Onion,
Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1226-27 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Borrago v. City of Louisville,
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Under the content-neutral O'Brien test, courts will uphold as
constitutional a regulation that incidentally infringes on protected
speech if it is "within the constitutional power of the Government,""
14
if it serves "an important or substantial governmental interest, ' 1 5 if




and if the protected speech is abridged "no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest."' 1 7 Under the Central Hudson test,
courts will conduct a four-part inquiry to determine the
constitutionality of governmental restraints on commercial speech. 18
This test requires that: (1) the commercial speech concern lawful
activity and not be misleading; (2) the restriction seek to implement a
substantial governmental interest; (3) the restriction directly advance
the substantial governmental interest; and (4) the restriction reach no
further than necessary to accomplish the objective. 19 Finally, as an
alternative to passing the Central Hudson or O'Brien tests, a content-
neutral abridgement may be permissible under the First Amendment
if it is a reasonable regulation of the time, place, and manner of
protected speech, if it is "necessary to further significant
governmental interests," 120  and if it "leave[s] ample alternative
456 F Supp. 30, 33 (W.D. Ky. 1978); Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 482 S.E.2d 347 (Ga.
1997); City of Rochester Hills v. Shultz, No. 193500, 1997 WL 355318, at *2 (Mich. App. June
24, 1997) (per curiam); Hamilton Amusement Ctr., Inc. v. Poritz, 689 A.2d 201, 205 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellvue, 937 P.2d 154, 168-69 (Wash.
1997). modfied, 943 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1997). But see Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1981) (citing O'Brien but not explicitly using the O'Brien test); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79 (1976) (distinguishing O'Brien on the facts);
Stephanie L. Bunting, Note, Unsightly Politics: Aesthetics, Sign Ordinances, and Homeowners'
Speech in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 473, 491 (1996) (arguing that the
majority in City of Ladue v. Gilleo analyzed the zoning ordinance as a content-neutral
restriction, but did not specifically articulate the traditional track-two formula).




118. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981).
119. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
120. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (upholding a ban on the
willful making of any noise on grounds adjacent to a school if such noise might disturb the
good order of the school session); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 573 (1965)
(upholding a ban on demonstrations in or near a courthouse with the intent to obstruct justice);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (upholding a limitation on the use of sound trucks).
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channels for communication." 2'
The conflict between zoning regulation and First Amendment
protection has been especially keen when the Court classifies a
content-based regulation as content-neutral.t 22 The Court has justified
such classifications on the basis that it must accord high respect to a
"city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life"'123
or that the regulation targets those secondary effects anticipated to
result from the regulated speech. The latter secondary effects analysis
has been applied simplistically by both the Supreme Court and lower
courts to uphold zoning regulations that operate as prior restraints on
First Amendment freedom by restricting certain "offensive" uses
prior to the occurrence of their anticipated adverse effects. For
example, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,124 the Court
upheld a zoning ordinance that, on its face, discriminated against
adult-use theaters. 25 The Court justified its holding on the basis that
the ordinance was aimed at the secondary effects of such theaters on
surrounding communities rather than at the content of the films.
126
This doctrine, as adopted in Renton, is one that "could gravely erode
First Amendment protections.'' 27 Some courts have recognized this
danger to First Amendment protections and have found that zoning
that limits the activities of bookstores and movie theaters dealing in
sexually oriented materials is an unconstitutional infringement of
First Amendment rights, even if the ordinance was not enacted with
121. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980) (citing
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977), and Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
122. See Smith, supra note 43, at 120 ("There can be little doubt that adult use zoning
ordinances are content-based restrictions: they classify businesses based on the content of the
material they sell.").
123. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
124. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
125. See id. at 54-55.
126. See id. at 47-48.
127. TRIBE, supra note 99, § 12-3, at 798-99 n.17 (noting that this doctrine "will likely
prove to be an aberration limited to the context of sexually explicit materials"); see also David
L. Hudson, Jr., 'Secondary Effects' Doctrine Is Fertile Ground for Abuse, 147 N.J.L.J. 1347
(1997) (discussing Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 1997), in which city
officials passed a restrictive zoning law against adult businesses without articulating any
information about harmful secondary effects, possibly because they "passed the law not because
of secondary effects, but out of a hostile desire to suppress free expression").
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the intent to suppress constitutionally protected speech.128 Indeed,
"[v]irtually all governmental controls of expression are directed, not
at the expression itself, but at the harm thought to result from
engaging in it."
'129
In a recent case, the Supreme Court recognized the danger of
applying the content-neutral approach it used in Renton to a
regulation that restricted First Amendment rights based on content. In
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,3° the Court invalidated as a prior
restraint a city ordinance that regulated adult entertainment and that
did not provide the essential safeguards required for a system of
censorship.' 31 The Court did not distinguish Renton 32 or Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 33 two of its prior decisions upholding
ordinances regulating adult uses, even though the Fifth Circuit had
upheld the Dallas ordinance as a content-neutral time, place, and
manner regulation under Renton. 134 Accordingly, the dissent noted
that
Renton and Young also make clear that there is a substantial
governmental interest in regulating sexually oriented
businesses because of their likely deleterious effect on the
areas surrounding them and that such regulation, although
focusing on a limited class of businesses involved in
expressive activity, is to be treated as content neutral.
35
As the dissent in FW/PBS demonstrates, certain members of the
128. See Glenn Rudolph, Comment, RICO: The Predicate Offense of Obscenity, The
Seizure of Adult Bookstore Assets, and the First Amendment, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 585, 601
(1988) (citing Bayside Enters., Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 702-03 (M.D. Fla. 1978), and
Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 450 F. Supp. 904, 907-08 (E.D.N.C. 1978)).
129. Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L.
REV. 422, 472 (1980); see also Smith, supra note 43, at 127 (observing that commentators have
noted that most restrictions on speech can be justified under "secondary effects" doctrine)
(citing John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Stud), in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Anali'sis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496-1502 (1975)).
130. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
131. Seeid. at 229.
132. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
133. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
134. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 222 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298, 1303
(1988)).
135. Id. at 244 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Court continue to support the "secondary effects" doctrine as a valid
method of giving less First Amendment protection to offensive uses.
These members of the Court would apply a "content-neutral" label to
those regulations that specifically target the anticipated adverse
effects of certain uses.
13 6
The low value that society gives to both sexual speech 37 and
commercial speech may justify attempts by the Court to balance the
suppression of free expression against a locality's attempt to "protect
the quality and character of community life.'' 138 However, the Court
should acknowledge that this is lower-value speech deserving less
protection, rather than using a lower level of scrutiny in zoning cases
that impact higher-value speech. 139 One mechanism that the Court has
used to retain constitutional protection for higher-level speech, while
restricting lower-value speech, categorizes speech into intermediate
levels deserving less protection. 140  Such categories include
"commercial speech, near-obscene and offensive speech, non-
obscene child pornography, defamation, and possibly the speech of
public employees."'141 The danger with this categorization model of
First Amendment analysis is that such "pigeonholing endangers the
136. The FW/PBS dissent further argued that the prior restraint doctrine applied in earlier
cases was not applicable because "the ordinance does not regulate content and thus it is unlike
the content-based prior restraints that this Court has typically scrutinized very closely." Id. at
246 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Vance v. Universal Amusement
Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980); National Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977);
Freedman v. Maryland 380 U.S. 51 (1965); and Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697
(1931)).
137. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
901 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the greater deference shown by the courts to
military and prison regulations that restrict speech); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.i. 1, 20-35 (1971) (suggesting that
"[c]onstitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political" and
that "[ihere is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it
scientific, literary, or that variety of expression we call obscene or pornographic").
138. TRIBE, supra note 99, § 12-19, at 947 (quoting HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 159 (1965)).
139. But see Smith, supra note 43, at 137-38 (endorsing a lower level of scrutiny for
zoning regulations that impact First Amendment rights on the basis that the purposes for zoning
relate to economics in the form of protecting property values, aesthetics, and regulatory
efficiency, which "are probably not compelling interests").
140. See TRIBE, supra note 99, § 12-18, at 929-44.
141. Id.at930.
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pigeon: if one parses First Amendment doctrine too finely, one may
soon discover that little protection for expression remains." 142 The
counter-argument to this position is that if we too broadly protect
offensive activities, we may inadequately protect community values.
The rebuttal to this counter-argument, however, is that common law
concepts of nuisance can be used to control, albeit after the fact, the
adverse effects of the more offensive activities.
A. Regulation ofAdult Uses
The regulation of adult uses in communities has produced, by far,
the greatest number of First Amendment conflicts with zoning
activity. The major Supreme Court cases in this area include Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc.,43 Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim,144 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,145 and
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas. 146 In addition, the public nuisance and
indecency cases of Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,147 Vance v.
Universal Amusement Co., 148 Arcara v. Cloud Books,'14 9 and Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc.'50 have added to the development of First
Amendment principles involving adult uses such as nude dancing,
adult theaters, and adult bookstores.
1. Regulating Secondary Effects
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,15' the Supreme Court held that
"a government interest may justify prohibiting an individual from
142. Id. at 943-44; see also Day, supra note 109, at 202 (calling for the abandonment of the
speech-restrictive public forum doctrine which "premises the degree of judicial protection on
generous presumptions about the intentions of government officials"); Smith, supra note 43, at
142-43 (advocating the use of the secondary effects doctrine for zoning cases, but recognizing
the danger "that the doctrine may be used to justify more and more creative and oppressive
restrictions on speech in the name of protecting the quality of life").
143. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
144. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
145. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
146. 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (plurality opinion).
147. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
148. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
149. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
150. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
151. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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using his property to display obscene materials."' 52 This decision set
the stage for the treatment of protected nonobscene speech in Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.153 In Young, the Court specifically
addressed an argument that ordinances prohibiting adult theaters from
exhibiting adult films protected by the First Amendment are prior
restraints on free speech. 54 The Young plurality dismissed the
argument, however, reasoning that it could not invalidate a zoning
regulation merely because material generally protected by the First
Amendment is the subject of a zoning regulation. 55
The Court found that the regulation of the location where adult
films could be shown did not violate the First Amendment, even
though it acknowledged that the ordinance treated adult theaters
differently from general-audience theaters. 56 In addition, the Court
recognized that the ordinance clearly was aimed at the content of the
material shown in the respective theaters.' 57 The plurality, however,
rather than analyzing the ordinance as a content-based restriction on
free expression, 158 justified the ordinance as a content-neutral
reasonable time, place, and manner regulation of protected speech
based on the city's inherent interest in regulating property for
commercial purposes. 159
152. Shannon McLin Carlyle, Note, Ban on Nude Dancing Strips Away First Amendment
Rights to Protect "Order and Morality" in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1337,
1358 (1992) (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-59 (1973)).
153. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
154. See Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 63.
157. See id.
158. The dissenting opinions of both Justice Stewart and Justice Blackmun noted that the
content-based restrictions contained in the ordinance amounted to a prior restraint on the
expression of material fully protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 84 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); id. at 91 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 62; see also supra notes 122-36 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's common justifications for classifying seemingly content-based regulations as content-
neutral).
Justice Powell's concurrence similarly applied the four-part O'Brien test and found that all
four parts were met because: (1) the ordinance was within the police power of the city to
preserve the character of specific areas of a city; (2) the interests of stable residential and
commercial neighborhoods were furthered by the ordinance, which protected against urban
deterioration; (3) the city did not intend to suppress free expression; and (4) the ordinance only
impacted those adult establishments that had been shown to contribute to deterioration of
surrounding areas. See id. at 79-82 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Like the Young Court, the Court in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc.16° employed a misguided analysis to validate an
ordinance that restricted the operation of adult theaters.
16 1
Recognizing that the Renton ordinance "does not appear to fit neatly
into either the 'content-based' or the 'content-neutral' category,"'
162
the Court analyzed the ordinance as a content-neutral time, place, and
manner regulation. 163 The Court explained that such an analysis was
appropriate because the ordinance, in the Court's eyes, was aimed at
the secondary effects of the adult theaters, not the content of the
films. 164 In addition, the Renton Court distinguished the prior
decisions of Schad and Erznoznik, which struck down content-based
regulations, on the grounds that the ordinance in Renton was
narrowly tailored to affect only those theaters that were likely to
produce unwanted secondary effects.
65
As a result of the Young and Renton decisions, cities are now
effectively permitted to regulate adult theaters by either dispersing
them or concentrating them. 166 As discussed above, 16 7 resorting to a
secondary effects argument to justify content-based regulation will
allow municipalities to restrict constitutionally protected expression
without subjecting their regulations to strict judicial scrutiny.168 By
not requiring municipalities to prove under a strict scrutiny standard
that they have established a narrowly tailored means of serving a
compelling governmental interest, we are not able to "insure that
cities will not use their zoning powers as a pretext for suppressing
constitutionally protected expression."'1
69
160. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
161. Seeid. at48-49.
162, Id. at 46-47.
163. See id.
164, See id. at 49.
165. Seeid. at 52.
166. See id.
167. See supra notes 122-36 and accompanying text.
168. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia confirmed that municipalities indeed have
resorted to such a pretext in his dissenting opinion in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S.
215 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He lamented that some
communities wishing to eliminate sexually oriented business in order to "prevent the erosion of
public morality" have been unsuccessful at doing so because "focusing upon the individual
books, motion pictures, or performances that these businesses market" will not be tolerated
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2. Applying the Prior Restraint Doctrine to Adult Use Regulation
Zoning ordinances that restrict adult uses should be analyzed as
prior restraints and invalidated unless they fall within one of the
narrow exceptions and contain sufficient procedural safeguards.
70
The decision to classify an ordinance as either content-based or
content-neutral should be made only when a court determines that the
regulation is a permissible prior restraint. Otherwise, the regulation
likely will be invalidated anyway based on the heavy presumption
against such restraints on First Amendment rights. 171
The use of the prior restraint doctrine in cases involving adult use
regulations is supported by the Supreme Court's opinion in Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim. 72 In Schad, the Court invalidated a
zoning ordinance that prohibited the exhibition of live dancing in a
commercial zone. 173 The Court set aside the statutory imposition of
criminal penalties against several bookstore owners who had
displayed live nude dancing, finding that the complete exclusion of
all live entertainment, including constitutionally protected
nonobscene nude dancing, was unconstitutional, even as a time,
place, and manner regulation. 174 Although the Court did not utilize
the prior restraint doctrine, it noted the possibility for a successful
overbreadth challenge based on the Mount Ephraim ordinance's
prohibition against all "commercial production of plays, concerts,
under the Court's stringent obscenity test which is "designed to avoid any risk of suppressing
socially valuable expression." Id. at 251-52. Instead, Justice Scalia indicated, these
"communities have resorted to a number of other means, including stringent zoning laws." Id. at
252 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and Renton, 475 U.S.
41 (1986)). Justice Scalia admitted that "these oblique methods" are less than effective at
eliminating "the perceived evil at which they are directed (viz., the very existence of sexually
oriented business anywhere in the community that does not want them)." Id.
170. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
171. The Court has, in fact, used the prior restraint and overbreadth concepts to invalidate
adult use ordinances without using either a content-based or content-neutral framework for
appraising such ordinances. See FW/PBS, Inc. V. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). In contrast to the content-neutral analysis of
Young and Renton, the Court in both Schad and FW/PBS invalidated municipal ordinances
aimed at adult entertainment.
172. 452U.S. 61 (1981).
173. See id. at 62.
174. See id. at 76.
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musicals, dance, or any other form of live entertainment."'175 Because
overbreadth challenges involving First Amendment issues are quite
similar in function and result to challenges under the prior restraint
doctrine, the Schad decision supports the use of a prior restraint
analysis in First Amendment zoning cases.176 Consistent with this
position, the Schad Court cautioned that zoning power is subject to
judicial review and that the standard of review will be determined by
the nature of the threatened right and not simply by the power being
exercised or by the limitation being imposed.'"
Going a step further than it did in Schad, a plurality of the Court
in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas 78 invalidated a Dallas licensing
scheme that employed zoning restrictions to regulate sexually
oriented businesses on the basis that it was an unconstitutional prior
restraint on First Amendment speech. 179 In analyzing the Dallas
licensing scheme, the Court substantially relied upon its earlier
holding in Freedman v. Maryland.18 0 The Freedman Court held that
the burden of proving that a form of speech is not protected by the
First Amendment lies with the party seeking to limit or ban the
speech.' 8 1 The Freedman Court further held that a scheme must allow
for a judicial determination of whether the speech in question indeed
is entitled to First Amendment protection.'82 Recognizing that "prior
restraints are not unconstitutional per se,"' 83 the FW/PBS Court
scrutinized the procedural safeguards available in the Dallas licensing
scheme and then determined that it was not necessary to examine the
full list of procedural protections outlined in Freedman.84 Examining
175. Id at 66 (noting that the bookstore owners "are entitled to rely on the impact of the
ordinance on the expressive activities of others as well as their own" in asserting their First
Amendment claim).
176. See Michael L. Charlson, The Constitutionality of Expanding Prepublication Review
of Government Employees' Speech. 72 CAL. L. REv. 962, 981-82 (1984) (discussing the various
criticisms of prior restraint as compared to overbreadth); Jeffries, supra note 63, at 433-34
(suggesting that the overbreadth doctrine replace the prior restraint doctrine).
177. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 68 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945)).
178. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
179. See id. at 229.
180. See id. at 223-30 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)).
181. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59.
182. Seeid.
183. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 225.
184. See id. at 228. But see id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding that all three of the
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only the first two safeguards required by Freedman, that "the licensor
must make the decision whether to issue the license within a
specified and reasonable time period during which the status quo is
maintained, and [that] there must be the possibility of prompt judicial
review in the event that the license is erroneously denied,"' 185 the
Court held that "the failure to provide these essential safeguards
renders the ordinance's licensing requirement unconstitutional insofar
as it is enforced against those businesses engaged in First
Amendment activity.
186
Thus, by applying the doctrine of prior restraint to a zoning
ordinance aimed at combating the secondary effects of adult
entertainment'8 7 and by concluding that the Dallas scheme lacked
adequate procedural safeguards,188 the FW/PBS Court avoided the
issue of whether the Dallas licensing scheme should be viewed as a
content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. 89 This Article's
proposed framework for analyzing zoning ordinances that involve
First Amendment rights is quite similar to the analytical structure
used by the FW/PBS Court: (1) courts should label as a prior restraint
the challenged zoning ordinance or licensing scheme; (2) if the
restraint falls within one of the exceptions to the doctrine, such as
obscenity, then courts should determine the restraint's
constitutionality according to the procedural requirements of
Freedman; and (3) if the procedural safeguards are sufficient, courts
should analyze the restraint under either a content-based strict
scrutiny analysis or the content-neutral O'Brien test (or a similar
time, place, and manner test).
The Supreme Court has been relatively consistent in its treatment
of First Amendment zoning cases by applying the O'Brien test, or an
equivalent time, place, and manner test, rather than the prior restraint
doctrine, to regulations that prohibit protected activities that allegedly
generate offensive secondary effects. In contrast, as described below,
several lower federal courts and state courts have followed the
procedural safeguards identified in Freedman should be applied).
185. Id. at228.
186. Id. at 229.
187. See id. at 225-30.
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approach used in Schad and FW/PBS and have applied the prior
restraint doctrine to invalidate zoning ordinances that impact First
Amendment rights.19° For example, in Entertainment Concepts, Inc.
v. Maciejewski,19' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals permanently
enjoined the enforcement of an ordinance requiring the revocation or
suspension of a movie theater's license upon a finding of
obscenity. 92 The court found that such a penalty was an
unconstitutional prior restraint that did not meet the procedural
safeguards of Freedman. 93 Similarly, in Spokane Arcades, Inc. v.
Brockett, 94 the Ninth Circuit held that a statute permitting a court to
close a place of business temporarily "because obscene materials may
have been sold, distributed, or exhibited on the premises is an
impermissible prior restraint.' 195
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit, in Redner v. Dean,196 held that a
county ordinance requiring owners of adult entertainment
establishments to obtain an operator's license was a prior restraint on
protected speech and lacked appropriate procedural safeguards.
197
The court analogized the ordinance to the licensing scheme in
FW/PBS 98 and distinguished it from the regulatory scheme in Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,199 finding that "[w]hile Barnes involved some
incidental limitations on the conduct associated with the expressive
activity, the instant case presents a complete restraint of protected
,,200
expression.
Recently, in 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's
County,20 1 the Fourth Circuit directly responded to the Supreme
Court's decision in FW/PBS by holding that an adult bookstore
ordinance that "focused directly at the placement of bookstores
190. See infra notes 191-210, 215-25, 233-37 and accompanying text.
191. 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980).
192. See id. at 505-06.
193. Seeid. at506.
194. 631 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 454 U.S. 1022 (1981).
195. Id. at 139.
196. 29 F.3d 1495 (11th Cir. 1994).
197. Seeid. at 1499-1503.
198. See id. at 1499-1500 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990)).
199. See id. at 1499 (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991)).
200. Id.
201. 58 F.3d 988 (4th Cir. 1995).
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selling non-obscene adult materials that are engaged in conduct
protected by the First Amendment' '202 is an unconstitutional prior
restraint on protected speech because it does not meet the procedural
safeguards required by Freedman.20 3 The Fourth Circuit distinguished
the ordinance at issue in Baltimore Boulevard from the zoning
ordinance upheld in Renton.204 The court noted that the ordinance at
issue in Renton did not require permission to engage in protected
speech because individuals were immediately free to engage in such
speech anywhere in the city that the limiting ordinance was not in
effect.20 5 In contrast, the ordinance at issue in Baltimore Boulevard
required parties who wished to engage in conduct proscribed by the
ordinance to seek the county's permission in the form of a special
exception.20 6 The Baltimore Boulevard court stated that
[fjollowing the decision in Renton, the [Supreme] Court has
made clear that otherwise valid content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions that require governmental permission prior
to engaging in protected speech must be analyzed as prior
restraints and are unconstitutional if they do not limit the
discretion of the decisionmaker and provide for the Freedman
procedural safeguards.20 7
The Baltimore Boulevard court thus rejected the county's argument,
which was based on Justice White's concurrence in FWPBS,208 that
the adult bookstore ordinance was "merely a content-neutral time,
place, and manner zoning restriction directed at the secondary effects
of such establishments" 20 9 and therefore not subject to prior restraint
202. Id. at 994.
203. See id. at 1001-02; see also Chesapeake B & M, Inc. v. Harford County, 58 F.3d
1005, 1010 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that "as we explain[ed more fully ... in 11126 Baltimore
Blvd ... licensing schemes directed at sexually oriented businesses engaged in protected
expressive activity pose special problems because of the risks of censorship and suppression
associated with prior restraints on speech").




208. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 244.49 (1990) (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. Baltimore Blvd., 58 F.3d at 996.
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analysis.:'
Determining whether a zoning ordinance is a prior restraint, based
upon its form as either an outright ban on certain uses in certain parts
of a locality or as a ban that allows a special exception if permission
is granted, is a disingenuous and ineffective method of avoiding the
Renton content-neutral analysis. 2" Instead, as the Supreme Court
made clear in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,212 a use restriction
should be tested by its "operation and effect., 21 3 Even without an
application requirement for a special use or permit, a zoning
ordinance operates as a prior restraint due to the implicit threat that
the municipality will enforce the zoning regulation against a
nonconforming use.214 In fact, zoning regulations that do not provide
for special exceptions or conditional uses operate all the more as a
prior restraint because they essentially deny use permission in
advance-they do not even allow a landowner to seek such
permission.
Federal district courts also have invalidated zoning ordinances
based on the prior restraint doctrine and ordinances' failure to meet
the procedural safeguards of Freedman. Several recent decisions
since FW/PBS have applied prior restraint concepts, rather than the
Renton approach, to zoning regulations that abridge protected speech.
Courts have justified this approach on the grounds that zoning
regulations requiring a special exception or conditional use permit
place "an unconstitutional level of substantive discretion in the hands
of city officials.,, 215 Admittedly, such zoning regulations are much
closer in appearance to the licensing scheme invalidated as a prior
210, Seeid at996.
211 See, e.g, Gascoe, Ltd. v. Newtown Township, 699 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(finding that a municipality's "use [of] its zoning power to prohibit entirely the distribution of
adult films within its jurisdiction . inflicts an unconstitutionally overbroad prior restraint on
free speech"). The court in Gascoe distinguished Young by noting that the statute in Young "did
not purport to approve the total exclusion from the city of theaters showing adult, but not
obscene, materials." Id. at 1096.
212. 283U.S.697(1931).
213. Id. at708.
214. See, e.g., 754 Orange Ave., Inc. v. City of West Haven, 761 F.2d 105, 111 (2d Cir.
1985) ("To anyone who would contemplate establishing a bookstore business within the City's
jurisdiction, the City's threat to enforce its zoning and licensing ordinances against (plaintiff]
operates as a prior restraint.")
215, Dease v. City of Anaheim, 826 F. Supp. 336, 343 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
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restraint in FW/PBS. However, local officials have substantive
discretion to draft and enact restrictive and exclusive regulations that
do not require permit approval, but that nevertheless present a danger
of self-censorship and "the difficulty of 'effectively detecting,
reviewing, and correcting content-based censorship "as applied"
without standards by which to measure the censor's action."' 216 Thus,
all types of zoning regulations, regardless of whether or not they
require a special permit, should be analyzed under the prior restraint
framework.
The district court in Dease v. City of Anaheim217 employed an
analysis that attempted to harmonize the Renton decision and the
FW/PBS decision.218 The court analyzed the constitutionality of a
conditional use permit ordinance by asking whether it constituted a
"'content-neutral, time, place, and manner restriction aimed at
secondary effects arising out of the sexually oriented businesses, 219
or whether it was an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected
speech.220
Some state courts have also attempted to reconcile Renton and
FW/PBS, but have applied the doctrine of prior restraint to invalidate
local ordinances that impact free speech rights.22' In California, for
216. Id. (quoting Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988)). Admittedly, it
also can be argued that addressing these problems using nuisance law instead of zoning
regulation merely transfers unbridled discretion to the courts.
217. 826 F. Supp. 336 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
218. See id. at341-44.
219. Id. at 342 (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990)); see
also Nakatomi Investments, Inc. v. City of Schenectady, 949 F. Supp. 988, 1002 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) (following the analytical approach of Dease when examining the constitutionality of an
ordinance); Younes Dia v. City of Toledo, 937 F. Supp. 673, 677 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (finding
that Renton applies to a content-neutral zoning ordinance, but not a licensing scheme); Santa Fe
Springs Realty Corp. v. City of Westminster, 906 F. Supp. 1341, 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (stating
that "[i]n determining the constitutionality of a conditional use permit ordinance, the court must
engage in a second level of analysis beyond the O'Brien test and deal with the issue of prior
restraints").
220. See Dease, 826 F. Supp. at 342.
221. See, e.g., Antico v. City of Indianapolis, 441 N.E.2d 999 (Ind. App. 1982) (holding
that an ordinance may not impose prior restraint on protected speech by preventing access to
adult businesses); Landover Books, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 566 A.2d 792, 804 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (finding that an "application procedure for a special exception is an
unconstitutional prior restraint since it leaves an improper degree of discretion in the local
zoning officials which exceeds the scope permitted in the First Amendment context"); Town of
Wayne v. Bishop, 565 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that a town's zoning
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol53/iss1/2
ZONING AWAY FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
example, the court in Smith v. County of Los Angeles222 followed the
Dease court's reasoning and adjudged the constitutionality of a
conditional use permit (CUP) requirement for adult businesses by
first determining whether the ordinance was a content-neutral time,
place, and manner restriction aimed at secondary effects or an
unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech.223 After concluding
that the Los Angeles CUP ordinance constituted a prior restraint,24
the court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional because, as a
land use regulation affecting adult entertainment, it did not use
"'narrow, objective and definite' standards focused on the secondary
effects of these businesses."
225
This Article proposes that, instead of attempting to reconcile
Renton and FW/PBS, the following approach should be used to
analyze the constitutionality of zoning regulations. First, treat the
zoning action as a prior restraint and check to see whether it falls
within one of the narrowly defined exceptions. If the zoning action
falls within one of the exceptions, apply the procedural safeguards
analysis to see whether the restraint is permissible. Finally, if the
procedural safeguards are met, and the regulation is not content-
based, apply a content-neutral time, place, and manner analysis.226
scheme "worked as an unconstitutional prior restraint on the defendants' First Amendment
rights"). But see Annapolis Road, Ltd. v. Anne Arundel County, 686 A.2d 727, 736-42 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1996) (affirming the issuance of an injunction against adult uses that violated a
zoning ordinance by finding that under Renton reasonable alternative means of communication
were allowed and under FW/PBS little or no administrative discretion was allowed) (citing
11126 Baltimore Blvd. v. Prince George's County, 58 F.3d 988 (4th Cir. 1995), and
Chesapeake B & M, Inc. v. Harford County, 58 F.3d 1005 (4th Cir. 1995)), rev'd, No. 20, 1998
WL 35377 (Md. App. Jan. 28, 1998).
222. 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
223. See id. at 685 (citing Dease v. City of Anaheim, 826 F. Supp. 336 (C.D. Cal. 1993)).
224. See id. at 687.
225. Id. at 692; see also People v. Library One, Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 400, 401-02, 405-06
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that Los Angeles Code provisions requiring a conditional use
permit for an adult bookstore and picture arcade were content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions, but deciding that "the absence of any specified time limit on the denial or issuance
of a business license or a conditional use permit renders the ordinance an invalid prior
restraint"). But see City of National City v. Wiener, 838 P.2d 223, 225 (Cal. 1992) (finding "a
zoning ordinance that combines both distance regulations and an exception for location of adult
businesses in certain shopping malls" constitutional under the Renton standard without even
mentioning FW/PBS).
226. For an example of this approach, see the discussion of the analytical approach used by
the court in 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 58 F.3d 988 (4th Cir.
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The district court in G. & A. Books, Inc. v. Stern227 used an
analytical structure similar to this Article's proposed approach by
first examining the contested zoning action under the prior restraint
doctrine and then subjecting it to a content-neutral analysis. 228 The
court held that a city redevelopment plan affecting existing adult uses
did not constitute a prior restraint and was not "unnecessarily
suppressive under the O'Brien standard. 229 The court noted that a
government land use regulation is not immunized from scrutiny and
must be examined to determine whether "it constitutes a prior
restraint on protected speech."230 The court concluded that "if it does
[constitute a prior restraint] we must enjoin it unless the government
carries the almost insurmountable burden of justifying such a
restraint.",231 The court further concluded that if the government
regulation "does not act as a prior restraint on protected speech, it
must still pass the somewhat less rigorous scrutiny mandated by
United States v. O'Brien.'z 2
The court in TJ's South, Inc. v. Town of Lowell233 also employed
an analysis similar to the one proposed in this Article. The TJ's South
court evaluated the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that
required eating-and-drinking establishments to obtain a special
exception from local authorities before presenting entertainment.
234
Contrary to the approach taken in Dease, the court in TJ's South first
analyzed the ordinance as a prior restraint on speech that was subject
to constitutional limitations.2 35 After concluding that the ordinance
was an unconstitutional prior restraint, the court determined that the
ordinance could not be saved even if "it passes the time, place, and
manner restriction test."236 The court noted that "once deemed an
unconstitutional prior restraint, a permit scheme is simply
1995), supra notes 201-10 and accompanying text.
227. 604 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 770 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1985).
228. See id. at 910-12.
229. Id. at 909.
230. Id. at 908.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. 895 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
234. See id. at 1126.
235. See id. at 1129 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225 (1990)).
236. Id. at 1134.
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unconstitutional, and no strong showing under time, place, and
manner doctrine can change that."237 As previously advocated, this
approach to analyzing special use permits should also be employed
when analyzing general zoning ordinances, which effectively operate
in advance of landowner action to preclude certain uses potentially
protected by the First Amendment.
3. Public Nuisance and Indecency Statutes
Municipalities also have regulated offensive land uses by using
public nuisance and public indecency statutes instead of, or in
addition to, general zoning ordinances and special permit and
licensing schemes. This type of regulation was involved in a series of
four Supreme Court cases: Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,238 Vance
v. Universal Amusement Co.,239 Arcara v. Cloud Books,240 and
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 241 In each of these cases, the Supreme
Court evaluated the application of public nuisance or public
indecency statutes to adult entertainment activity protected as First
Amendment expression.
In Erznoznik, the Court invalidated a city ordinance that declared
as a public nuisance the exhibition of films containing nudity at a
drive-in movie theater when the theater's screen is visible from a
public place.242 Although the Court's decision was not based on the
concept of prior restraint, the Court evaluated the ordinance as a
content-based restriction on protected expression.243 The City of
237. Id. (noting that even if it should analyze the ordinance under a time, place, and manner
test, the litigants had not addressed the issue and the court could not independently do so). One
of the more recent district court decisions, Franken Equities v. City of Evanston, 967 F. Supp.
1233 (D. Wyo. 1997), followed the FW/PBS approach in rejecting a city's contention that its
special use permit requirement should be analyzed under Renton as a content-neutral time,
place, and manner regulation. See id. at 1236-37. The court instead analyzed the city's
ordinance as a prior restraint and proceeded to determine that the procedural safeguards of
Freedman had not been met. See id. at 1237.
238. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
239. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
240. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
241. 501 U.S. 560(1991).
242. See 422 U.S. at 206-07.
243. See id. at 211 (noting that the "'ordinance discriminates among movies solely on the
basis of content").
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Jacksonville argued that the purposes of the ordinance were to protect
citizens against unwilling exposure to offensive materials,244 to
protect minors from the display of films containing nudity,245 and to
facilitate traffic regulation by protecting passing motorists from the
distraction of nudity on a drive-in movie screen.246 However, the
Court held that even these legitimate interests failed to satisfy the
demanding constitutional standards that apply when the government
regulates expression on the basis of its content.247 Thus, while the
Erznoznik Court did not use a prior restraint approach, its content-
based analysis is protective of expression and is, therefore, consistent
with the analytic framework proposed in this Article. If a regulation
is not invalidated as a prior restraint, it must be evaluated as either a
content-based or content-neutral restriction. In Erznoznik, the
regulation was content-based and, therefore, could not satisfy the
strict review standard applied by the Court.
The Supreme Court has indeed viewed the public nuisance form
of regulation as a prior restraint in at least one zoning case involving
adult uses. In Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.,248 the Court
refused to enforce a Texas public nuisance statute that prohibited the
exhibition of motion pictures in an adults-only theatre absent a
judicial finding that the films were not obscene.249 The Court upheld
the Fifth Circuit's decision that the statute was a prior restraint on
First Amendment rights and lacked the "'procedural safeguards
required under Freedman v. Maryland."'250 However, unlike the
Court's Vance decision, in Arcara v. Cloud Books,25t the Court
rejected a prior restraint analysis and refused to apply the O'Brien
test to a New York statute that authorized the closure of an adult
bookstore. 2  The Court declared that "the First Amendment is not
244. See id. at 208.
245. Seeid. at212.
246. Seeid. at214.
247. See id. at 217.
248. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
249. Seeid. at311,317.
250. Id. at 314 (quoting Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 587 F.2d 159, 169 (5th Cir.
1978), af[d, 445 U.S. 308 (1980)).
251. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
252. See id. at 707. The lower court had found that the closure of a bookstore under a
public nuisance statute was an unconstitutional prior restraint because the closure infringed
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implicated by the enforcement of a public health regulation of general
application against the physical premises in which respondents
happen to sell books. 253 The Court then went on to hold that the
closure sanction was a constitutional exercise of legislation "directed
at unlawful conduct having nothing to do with books or other
expressive activity."' 2- Although the Arcara Court failed to apply the
prior restraint doctrine, Arcara factually supports this Article's
proposal to use common law nuisance to resolve land use disputes
that arise when First Amendment activities generate actual harmful
effects."
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,256 the Court was confronted with
an Indiana public indecency statute that required dancers in adult
entertainment establishments to wear, at a minimum, pasties and G-
strings.257 The Court analyzed the restriction under a content-neutral
approach and, after applying the four-part O'Brien test, upheld the
indecency statute. 258 In applying the O'Brien test to measure the
conduct's level of First Amendment protection, the Court found that
Indiana's interest in protecting morals and public order was not a
form of suppression of free expression because "[p]ublic nudity is the
evil the State seeks to prevent, whether or not it is combined with
expressive activity. ,259 Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion, also
applied the O 'Brien test to uphold the indecency statute.260 However,
Souter characterized the government's interest as "combating the
secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments, 26' like the
upon protected bookselling activities. See id. at 701.
253. Id. at 707.
254. Id.
255. For an extensive discussion of Arcara, see Forshay, supra note 110.
256. 501 U.S, 560(1991).
257. See id. at 565. The Court had held in earlier cases that nude dancing is a protected
form of expression. See id. (citing California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972), and Schad v.
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (both holding that nude dance is expressive conduct
within the -'marginal" protection of the First Amendment)).
258. See id.
259. Id. at 571. Justice White aptly noted in dissent, however, that "the purpose of applying
the law to the nude dancing performances in respondents' establishments is to prevent their
customers from being exposed to the distinctive communicative aspects of nude dancing" and
"[w]here the government prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative attributes,
we hold the regulation unconstitutional." Id. at 596 (White, J., dissenting).
260 See id. at 583-87 (Souter, J.- concurring).
261. id at 582.
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government's interest in Renton,262 rather than as an interest in
"society's moral views. 263 Justice Souter's approach in Barnes is,
thus, just as misguided as the approaches taken by the Court in Young
and Renton because it regulates expression based on its content in an
effort to address secondary effects. However, Souter's concurrence is
at least consistent with Renton and Young and, thus, lends itself to
this Article's proposal that communities use common law nuisance to
combat harmful secondary effects associated with adult entertainment
establishments.
The frightening aspect of the Barnes decision, and its impact on
First Amendment protection, emerged in Justice Scalia's
concurrence, wherein he suggested that free speech principles should
be handled in the same way that the Court handled a free exercise
claim in Employment Division v. Smith.26 Justice Scalia urged that
the Court uphold the challenged Indiana regulation, not based upon
the O'Brien test, but "because, as a general law regulating conduct
and not specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to First
Amendment scrutiny at all. '265 To encourage the adoption of such a
regime in the free speech area, Justice Scalia argued that "[t]here is
even greater reason to apply this approach to the regulation of
expressive conduct 2 66 because "[r]elatively few can plausibly assert
that their illegal conduct is being engaged in for religious reasons, but
almost anyone can violate almost any law as a means of
expression.,
267
While this author agrees that the Court should afford as much
First Amendment protection to freedom of speech and expression as
it does to religious exercise, the Court should achieve such equality
by increasing the level of protection for free exercise of religion,
rather than by decreasing the level of protection for speech. Those
scholars who support an increased level of scrutiny for regulation that
abridges free exercise should be careful to avoid passively allowing
262. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
263. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring).
264. See id. at 579 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)).
265. Id. at 572.
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zoning to compromise free speech rights merely because most of the
cases involve aesthetically displeasing uses or offensive adult uses.
The concern expressed by Justice Black in Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Board,268 that "the freedoms of speech,
press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment
must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be
denied to the ideas we cherish," 269 has never been greater than it is
now, particularly because we have witnessed another attack on the
cherished protection of religious freedom in City of Boerne v.
Flores.270
4. An Example of Applying a New Constitutional Approach to
Protect Expression
The control of sexually oriented businesses in our communities is
a difficult land use issue because majoritarian principles generally
conflict with allowing these adult uses to locate close to our
neighborhoods. However, if our society determines that such uses are
deserving of at least minimal free speech protection, 71 we cannot let
our distaste for such activity reduce the level of First Amendment
protection that we afford such activity when examining zoning
regulations. If a zoning ordinance restricts the location of sexually
oriented uses, or requires a license or special permit prior to allowing
such an adult use, the regulation constitutes a prior restraint on
protected speech. Zoning officials and city council members must not
268, 367 U.S. 1 (1961)
269 Id. at 137 (Black, J., dissenting).
270 117 S. Ct. 2157; see also discussion infra notes 432-40 and accompanying text.
Justice O'Connor stated in her Boerne dissent:
The Religion Clauses of the Constitution represent a profound commitment to
religious liberty. Our Nation's Founders conceived of a Republic receptive to
voluntary religious expression, not of a secular society in which religious expression is
tolerated only when it does not conflict with a generally applicable law.... Given the
centrality of freedom of speech and religion to the American concept of personal
liberty, it is altogether reasonable to conclude that both should be treated with the
highest degree of respect.
Id. at 2185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
271. This author assumes that society's values are generally reflected in Supreme Court
decisions and in the Constitution.
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be allowed to use "unbridled discretion" to prevent speech that they
find to be offensive. Protecting the community against offensive
secondary effects generated by protected speech is a goal that can be
achieved more efficiently by using common law nuisance and,
perhaps, private covenants.
272
Regulation of adult uses is based upon a classification of the
content of the expression as sexually explicit, but not obscene. Such
content-based restrictions of protected speech must be justified by a
compelling state interest.273 If, however, a regulation is truly content-
neutral, such as a ban on all movie theaters in a city, then the
Supreme Court's approach in Young and Renton would be
appropriate. Under such circumstances, courts should evaluate a
regulation as a time, place, and manner restriction, or analyze it under
the O'Brien test to verify the restriction's constitutionality.
The following hypothetical illustrates the author's proposed
constitutional approach as applied to an adult entertainment business.
Suppose that a city enacts a zoning law which requires that, subject to
the issuance of a conditional use permit, all adult entertainment
businesses may be established only within two designated zoning
districts. If the owner of a tavern located outside of these two
designated districts wishes to offer nude dancing, the tavern owner
will be unable to do so unless she relocates the tavern to one of the
two designated districts. This burden on free expression restricts First
Amendment rights in advance of the communication and operates as
a prior restraint. Even if the tavern owner's business is located in one
of the designated districts, the requirement that she obtain a
conditional use permit before offering adult entertainment is also a
prior restraint. Whether the regulation is viewed as a prior restraint
because it restricts free expression in all but two districts, or,
alternatively, because it requires that a government official issue a
permit, such a prior restraint bears a heavy presumption against
constitutional validity.274 Such a prior restraint will only be
272. See discussion infra Part VI.
273. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a
New Hampshire statute requiring the phrase "Live Free or Die" on motor vehicle registration
plates).
274. See, e.g., Organizing For a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
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permissible if it falls within one of the exceptions already identified
by the Court.275 Because this hypothetical regulation against adult
entertainment does not prevent the publication of sensitive military
information, prevent an incitement to an act of violence, prevent
obscene expression, or attempt to preserve a defendant's right to a
fair trial, it cannot be allowed as a prior restraint.
276
Even if the above hypothetical city successfully argues that its
regulation is a permissible prior restraint because its purpose is to
prevent obscene expression, the city must still establish that it has
implemented "procedural safeguards [that are] designed to obviate
the dangers of a censorship system., 277 This would require the city to
prove: (1) that the affected right, nude dancing, is unprotected under
the First Amendment; (2) that the restraint is limited to a preservation
of the status quo for the shortest period that comports with sound
judicial procedure; and (3) that a court will make a prompt, final
judicial determination of whether the expression is obscene and,
therefore, not protected under the First Amendment. 278 Because nude
dancing is protected under the First Amendment and the regulation
will not be subject to a prompt, final judicial determination that it is
obscene, the hypothetical zoning ordinance does not meet the
procedural safeguards of Freedman.279
Hence, according to this Article's suggested constitutional
approach to balancing First Amendment rights and zoning
regulations, the hypothetical adult-entertainment zoning ordinance
should be invalidated as an impermissible prior restraint. Even if we
assume that the city could satisfy the procedural requirements of
Freedman, by restricting in advance only obscene adult
entertainment, such a regulation would still be subject to judicial
scrutiny as either a content-based or content-neutral restriction.
Because the city has targeted only adult entertainment, rather than,
for example, the opera or ballet, the regulation must be considered
content-based. Such a content-based restriction on protected
275. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
277. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
278. See id. at 58-59.
279. See id.; see also supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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expression will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The fact that this
type of entertainment may be considered distasteful or morally
repugnant to city officials and their constituents is not a sufficiently
compelling interest to uphold the restriction under strict scrutiny.
Moreover, the anticipated secondary effects, such as crime and
decreased property values, are probably also insufficiently
compelling governmental interests if the adverse effects have not yet
occurred.
Even if we use the Renton approach of viewing the hypothetical
zoning regulation as a content-neutral regulation aimed at curbing
adult entertainment's deleterious secondary effects, the regulation
must still be evaluated under either a time, place, and manner test, or
the O'Brien test. Under the O'Brien test, the city's interest in
regulating adult entertainment must be substantial and unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, and the regulation must restrict
expression no more than is necessary to achieve the city's interest. In
order to satisfy the requirements of a permissible time, place, and
manner regulation, the city will need to show that there are suitable
sites available in the two districts where adult entertainment is
permitted. The city will also need to show that the secondary effects
generated by such uses are sufficiently likely to occur and will be
substantially detrimental to the other zoning districts.
As this hypothetical illustrates, using the prior restraint doctrine
will more generously accommodate protected speech and will require
government officials to discontinue using their discretion to shield
the public from certain types of expression that they consider to be
offensive. Expressive conduct cannot be regulated in advance of
adverse secondary effects occurring, even if the reasons for the
regulation are unrelated to the suppression of speech. Moreover,
when regulation of protected expression cannot withstand scrutiny as
either a prior restraint, a content-based restriction, or even a content-
neutral regulation, nuisance law can still serve as the mechanism to
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B. Regulation of Commercial and Noncommercial Billboards
and Signs
Another difficult land use issue arises when communities attempt
to zone their locales for aesthetic purposes by restricting or
eliminating the "blight" of billboards and signs. Until the mid-1970s,
the Free Speech Clause protected only noncommercial speech against
land use regulations.28 0 The Supreme Court extended free speech
protection to commercial speech in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 281 In Virginia
Board of Pharmacy, the Court found unconstitutional a Virginia law
that prohibited prescription drug price advertising, even though
Virginia had a strong interest in promoting "professionalism on the
part of licensed pharmacists. ' 282 Virginia Board of Pharmacy's
extension of constitutional protection to commercial speech quickly
engendered much litigation and uncertainty about a community's
ability to regulate commercial speech under the scope of the police
power. However, not until 1981 did the Court fully consider a case
involving a First Amendment challenge to a regulation that limited
the use of billboards.8 3 The Court's subsequent analysis of billboard
and sign ordinances has varied based on whether an ordinance affects
commercial or noncommercial speech, and whether the ordinance is a
content-based or content-neutral restriction.
1. Regulation of Commercial Billboards and Signs
An ordinance regulating the content of commercial
communication, as opposed to the form of such communication, must
280. See MANDELKER, supra note 5, § 2.44, at 67.
281. 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (holding that a statute prohibiting commercial advertisement
of prescription drug prices is unconstitutional). This decision was preceded by Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), which held that a statute prohibiting advertisement,
encouragement, or procurement of an abortion was unconstitutional because speech that is
protected does not lose protection just because it appears in the form of a paid advertisement.
Seeid. at 818.
282. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766.
283. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). Prior to 1981, the
Court chose "on several occasions summarily to affirm decisions sustaining state or local
legislation directed at billboards." Id. at 498.
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be justified by both the compelling importance of the state's interest
in such regulation and evidence that the regulation is necessary to
meet the government's stated purpose or objective.2 84 In Linmark
Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,285 a case involving the
content of commercial speech, the Supreme Court invalidated a
township's ordinance prohibiting the posting of "For Sale" or "Sold"
signs.286 The township's stated purpose for the ordinance was "to
stem what it perceive[d] as the flight of white homeowners from a
racially integrated community., 287 Here, as in Virginia Board of
Pharmacy,288 the purpose of the ordinance was to regulate the content
of communication, not just its form.28 9 The Court recognized the
importance of the township's goal to promote stable, racially-
integrated housing, but concluded that the township's goal in
enacting the ordinance did not distinguish the case from Virginia
Board of Pharmacy.290 Thus, in both Virginia Board of Pharmacy
and Linmark, the Court determined that the respective regulations
were not necessary to achieve the government's stated objective, and
that the First Amendment precludes government from achieving its
goals "by restricting the free flow of truthful information."
29
'
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,292 the Court considered
a case involving both a content-neutral regulation of commercial
speech and an incidental regulation of noncommercial speech.293 The
ordinance at issue regulated billboards for traffic safety and aesthetic
purposes, and applied only to permanent structures that displayed
284. See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1977).
285. 431 U.S. 85(1977).
286. See id. at 97.
287. Id. at 86.
288. See 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
289. See 431 U.S. at 94.
290. See id. at 95.
291. Id. Content-based regulation of commercial speech is still dangerous when the
government attempts to "single out certain messages for suppression," 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1507 (1996), and the "mere fact that messages propose
commercial transactions does not in and of itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should
apply to decisions to suppress them." Id. The Linmark Court left open the question of "whether
a ban on signs or a limitation on the number of signs could survive constitutional scrutiny if it
were unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Linmark, 431 U.S. at 94 n.7.
292. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
293. See id. at 494 n.2.
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commercial or other noncommercial advertisements. 294  The
ordinance did, however, provide for certain exceptions to the City's
general ban on signs. These exceptions included permitting the
property occupant to advertise his own goods or services.295
The Metromedia Court separately evaluated the ordinance's effect
on commercial and noncommercial speech.296 The Court first applied
the four-part test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission297 to the less-protected, content-neutral
commercial speech restriction.298  Finding that the San Diego
ordinance met the constitutional requirements of Central Hudson,299
the Metromedia Court then analyzed the general ban on signs
carrying noncommercial advertising to determine its constitutional
validity. 3°° The Court acknowledged that noncommercial speech is
given greater protection under the First Amendment than commercial
speech 301 and refused to apply a time, place, and manner analysis to
an ordinance that distinguished "between permissible and
impermissible signs at a particular location by reference to their
content." 302 Accordingly, the Court held that the San Diego ordinance
was unconstitutional on its face because of its prohibition of
noncommercial speech.30 3
294. See id, at 503 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407 (Cal.
1980)).
295 See id
296. See id. at 504-05.
297. 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980).
298. See Metromedia. 453 U.S. at 507. As discussed earlier, the Central Hudson test,
which the Court applies to commercial speech, requires that: (1) the commercial speech
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) the restriction seeks to implement a
substantial governmental interest; (3) the restriction directly advances that interest; and (4) the
restriction reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the objective. See Central Hudson,
447 U.S. at 563-66.
299. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512.
300. Seeid. at512-13.
301. Seeid. at513.
302. Id. at 516-17.
303. See id. at 521. The Court noted, however, that "the California courts may sustain the
ordinance by limiting its reach to commercial speech." Id at 522 n.26. Following the
Metromedia decision, the Supreme Court adopted the Central Hudson test for evaluating the
constitutional validity of commercial billboard and sign regulations. The Court later modified
Central Hudson's four-prong test in Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469 (1989), which held that the protection of commercial speech requires a restriction
"that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means, but ... a means narrowly tailored to
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Commercial speech restrictions are not limited to regulations
designed to combat the secondary effects of visual blight and
aesthetics. Government officials also have attempted to restrict
advertising's content in order to combat the effects it may have on
listeners' conduct. This type of restriction was at issue in 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.0 4 In 44 Liquormart, a Rhode
Island statute banned liquor vendors from advertising outside of their
stores the retail price of any alcoholic beverage.30 5 The stated
purposes of the statute were to promote temperance and to control the
traffic in alcoholic beverages.30 6 After examining the commercial
speech restriction, the Court held that the statute was invalid because
it abridged speech protected by the First Amendment. 30 7 To
determine the statute's constitutionality, the Court applied the four-
prong Central Hudson test.30 8 The Court did not distinguish between
a content-based commercial speech restriction that targets speech's
effect on a listener's conduct and a content-neutral commercial
speech regulation that is directed at the secondary effects of speech.
However, in his concurrence, Justice Thomas aptly noted that where
"the government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product
or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the
marketplace," 30 9 the Central Hudson balancing test should not be
achieve the desired objective." Id. at 480. The Supreme Court applied the Fox "reasonable fit"
test along with the Central Hudson factors in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Netvork Inc., 507
U.S. 410 (1993), to find that Cincinnati's ban on commercial newsracks was not valid because
the city did not "establish a 'reasonable fit' between its legitimate interests in safety and
esthetics," id. at 416, and its prohibition of newsracks as a way of satisfying its goals. See id.
This requirement of a "reasonable fit" is used to evaluate the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test, which requires that the restriction be no more extensive than necessary to serve the
stated interest. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1521 (1996)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566); see also Dwight E.
Merriam et al., The First Amendment in Land Use Law, 1993 LAND USE INSTITUTE 1007, 1017
(noting that although not a "sign case," Fox may be important for commercial sign cases
because of its holding that protection of commercial speech does not require that government
restrictions satisfy the "least restrictive means" test).
304. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
305. See id. at 1501.
306. See id. at 1502 n.4.
307. See id. at 1515. The Court also noted that the ordinance was "not shielded from
constitutional scrutiny by the Twenty-First Amendment." Id. at 1501.
308. See id. at 1506-13. But see id. at 1521-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (advocating a
more stringent standard under Central Hudson).
309. Id. at 1518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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applied.1 ° Justice Thomas stated that the Court, instead, should
adhere to the doctrine adopted in Virginia Pharmacy Board and strike
down a regulation as impermissible if it attempts to "dissuade legal
choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant .... ,311
Regulation of commercial speech by zoning ordinances that
restrict such expression in advance of its occurrence should be
analyzed under the prior restraint doctrine. Such a prior restraint will
be impermissible unless it falls within a recognized exception and
meets the Freedman procedural requirements. 31 2 If such a regulation
is upheld as a permissible prior restraint, it then must be evaluated as
either a content-based or content-neutral restriction. If the restriction
is based on the content of the commercial message conveyed, it must
meet the compelling state interest test. Alternatively, if the restriction
is content-neutral, courts must apply the less rigorous Central
Hudson test.
2. Regulation of Noncommercial Billboards and Signs
In Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent,3 13 the Court analyzed the constitutionality of a Los Angeles
ordinance that restricted noncommercial political speech. The
ordinance restricted the posting of signs on public property, including
sidewalks, utility poles, and trees.314 Noting that "the text of the
ordinance is [content-]neutral-indeed it is silent-concerning any
speaker's point of view, 31 5 the Court employed a time, place, and
manner analysis using the O'Brien test.316 The Court held that the
ordinance was a valid, view-point neutral restriction on protected
speech, and that it was justified by the city's substantial interest in
310 Seeid
311, Id at 1520 (Thomas, J, concurring); see also State Bd. of Va. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S 748, 771 (1976) (time, place, and manner test determined to be
inappropriate because challenged statute "'singles out speech of a particular content and seeks to
prevent its dissemination completely").
312, See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
313. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
314 See Merriam, supra note 303, at 1023-24 (citing Vincent, 466 U.S. at 791).
315o Vincent, 466 US. at 804.
316 See id.
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aesthetic and safety objectives.1 7
In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,318 the Court confronted the issue of
whether an ordinance prohibiting homeowners from displaying most
types of signs on their property violated a resident's right to free
speech.31 9 The Court compared signs, as a form of expression, with
oral speech and noted that signs "take up space and may obstruct
views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses for land, and pose
other problems that legitimately call for regulation."3 20 Nevertheless,
the Court recognized that regulating signs affects communication
itself and, therefore, it was required to examine the ordinance for
constitutional validity.321 After analyzing the city's ordinance as a
content-neutral restriction on protected speech, the Court held that
"Ladue's ban on almost all residential signs violates the First
Amendment.
322
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence with a unanimous Court,
protested the Court's failure to follow the general constitutional
inquiry, which is "first, to determine whether a regulation is content-
based or content-neutral, and then, based on the answer to that
question, to apply the proper level of scrutiny." 323 In other words,
Justice O'Connor believed that the Court should have analyzed the
ordinance as a content-based, rather than a content-neutral, restriction
on protected speech. A content-based restriction would have required
a compelling state interest in order to restrict protected speech; but,
consistent with Young and Renton, the Court applied a "track two"
analysis324 because the purpose of the restriction "was not censorship,
but rather a desire to 'preserve the quality of urban life' by avoiding
the 'secondary effects' ' 325 of such uses on the community.
326
317. See id. at 816-17.
318. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
319. Seeid. at45-4 6.
320. Id. at 48.
321. Seeid. at48-51.
322. Id. at 58.
323. Id. at 59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
324. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
325. Bunting, supra note 113, at 495 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc,, 427
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3. The Prior Restraint Doctrine Applied to Billboards and Signs
Unlike its analysis of adult use restrictions, the Supreme Court has
not yet employed the doctrine of prior restraint to invalidate either a
commercial or noncommercial billboard or sign regulation.
Nevertheless, in at least two recent district court cases, courts have
used the doctrine to prohibit municipalities from restricting protected
32speech on the basis of safety and aesthetic concerns. 27 In Abel v.
Town of Orangetown,328 a political candidate sued to enjoin
Orangetown officials from removing political signs that he had
placed along the unpaved portion of a public right of way.329 The
officials sought to remove the signs pursuant to an ordinance which
provided that "[n]o sign other than signs placed by agencies of the
government shall be placed on any public property unless written
consent is first obtained from the Orangetown Town Board. '330 The
candidate argued that the ordinance violated his First Amendment
right to freedom of speech.331 The district court held that the
regulation was "an unacceptable prior restraint on speech 332 because
the ordinance granted the town unbridled discretion in deciding
whether to grant permission to post the signs,333 and because the
ordinance did not contain standards to guide the town decision.
334
Similarly, in MacDonald Advertising Co. v. City of Pontiac,335 a
federal district court held that a zoning ordinance that required the
issuance of a special exception permit before a billboard could be
erected336 was facially invalid and violated the First Amendment.337
The MacDonald court was concerned that "when a city institutes a
permit system to engage in activities which have a close nexus to
327. See MacDonald Adver. Co. v. City of Pontiac, 916 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Mich. 1995);
Abel v. Town of Orangetown, 759 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
328. 759 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
329. See id. at 162-63.
330 Id at 162.
331. See id. at 162-63.
332. Id at 163-64.
333 Seeid. at 163.
334. See id. at 65.
335. 916 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
336. See id. at 645.
337. See id. at 650.
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expression," 338 the city must ensure that the final permit decision is
not based on the content or viewpoint of the protected expression.339
The MacDonald court declared that, without neutral criteria to guide
an official's decision, such "unbridled discretion in the hands of a
government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may
result in censorship. '340 Having held that the ordinance was an
invalid prior restraint, the court found it unnecessary to determine
whether the ordinance was valid under Central Hudson.
341
Nonetheless, the court noted that the ordinance regulating
commercial speech would be invalid under the governmental-interest
prong of the Central Hudson test because "esthetics alone is an
insufficient reason for governmental use restrictions let alone
restrictions on speech." 342
Communities have a legitimate interest in regulating the
proliferation of signs and billboards in order to promote traffic safety
and aesthetics.343 A majority of courts have held that aesthetic
concerns alone sufficiently justify governmental land use
regulation.344  The government generally will address aesthetic
concerns by enacting content-neutral regulations aimed at the adverse
secondary effects generated by the form of an expression. However,
cities may also attempt to regulate advertising in order to protect their
citizens from the message being conveyed.345 This latter type of
338. Id. at 648.
339. See id. at 648-49 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,
760 (1988)).
340. Id. (citing Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 759).
341. Seeid. at650n.9.
342. Id. (citations omitted).
343. Cf Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (upholding the taking of private property to
eliminate slums and beautify the nation's capital).
344. See MANDELKER, supra note 5, § 11.05, at 460. But see Desert Outdoor Adver., Inc.
v. City of Moreno, 103 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a provision of a city sign
ordinance violated the First Amendment by giving city officials unbridled discretion to deny a
permit for an off-site sign determined to be harmful to the city's health, welfare, or "aesthetic
quality"); Bunting, supra note 113, at 478 (explaining that "some courts view[] aesthetic values
'not as preventing public harm but as a legislative attempt to confer a benefit on the public at
the expense of a private landowner without paying for it,' thus likening aesthetic zoning to a
taking of property" (quoting James P. Karp, The Evolving Meaning of Aesthetics in Land-Use
Regulation, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 307,310 (1990))).
345. See. e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996); Linmark
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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regulation is necessarily content-based and should require a higher
level of constitutional scrutiny than that given to content-neutral
regulations. Whether zoning regulation of billboards and signs is used
to protect aesthetics or to protect citizens from the actual message,
when such regulation impacts expression protected by the First
Amendment, courts must scrutinize the constitutional limits of such
governmental restrictions.
This Article proposes that courts should evaluate zoning
restrictions on billboards and signs with the same constitutional
scrutiny that they use to evaluate zoning restrictions on adult uses.
Courts should employ the same level of scrutiny regardless of
whether such ordinances require a permit, license, or special
exception before the expression is allowed. Zoning regulations of
billboards and signs should be invalidated as prior restraints unless
they fall into one of the identified exceptions and meet the procedural
safeguards of Freedman.346 If the regulation at issue is not an invalid
prior restraint, a court must then ask whether the restriction is
content-based or content-neutral. If it is content-based, the court
should invalidate the regulation unless it is justified by a compelling
governmental interest that cannot be achieved by less restrictive
means. Alternatively, if the regulation is content-neutral, and is
directed at the secondary effects of visual blight or interference with
traffic safety, a court must analyze it according to whether the speech
it seeks to restrict is commercial or noncommercial. If the content-
neutral restricted speech is noncommercial, a court must evaluate the
restriction under the O'Brien test to determine its constitutionality.
However, if the content-neutral restricted speech is commercial, it is
given less protection. A court evaluating a regulation that restricts
such speech should apply the four-prong Central Hudson test. Here
again, common law nuisance actions will serve well as the
mechanism for addressing actual adverse effects that governments
cannot legislatively regulate in advance of their occurrence.347
346. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
347. See discussion infra Part VI.
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C. Regulation of Speech Activities on Public Streets and Sidewalks
Another category of land use regulations that affect protected
speech is regulations that restrict expression on public streets or
sidewalks. Such regulations have been challenged as First
Amendment violations in contexts involving varied forms of
expression. These forms of expression include sound amplification
devices,348  demonstrations,349  solicitations, °  marches, 35
freestanding newsracks,352 art vendors,353 and abortion protests.354
While several of these cases have involved permit systems, even
general regulations restricting protected expression in public areas
may invoke the prior restraint doctrine. Saia v. New York355 is a case
that illustrates why the doctrine of prior restraint is an important
vehicle for protecting such First Amendment freedoms.
In Saia, the city prohibited the use of sound amplification devices
unless an individual had obtained from the Chief of Police permission
to use such devices. 6 The city denied a minister's request for
renewal of his permit because residents had registered complaints
regarding amplified lectures that he gave in a public park.3  The
Court held that the ordinance, which sanctioned fines and jail
sentences against the minister when he continued to use amplification
equipment without a permit, was unconstitutional on its face as a
prior restraint on the right of free speech. 8 Describing the type of
problems that could result from such a permit scheme, the Court said:
348. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
349. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
350. See, e.g., Village ofSchaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980);
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
351. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
352. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
353. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996).
354. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
355. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
356. See id. at 558.
357. See id. at 559.
358. See id. at 559-60.
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In this case a permit is denied because some persons were said
to have found the sound annoying. In the next one a permit
may be denied because some people find the ideas annoying.
Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound. The
power of censorship inherent in this type of ordinance reveals
its vice.359
The Court emphasized that, when balancing community interests
against the freedoms of the First Amendment, the First Amendment
is in the preferred position.
1. Permits for Public Solicitation and Demonstrations
The prior restraint doctrine has been used to invalidate regulations
that restrict the solicitation of membership for organizations. For
example, a permit system at issue in Staub v. City of Baxley361 made
it an offense to "'solicit' citizens of the City of Baxley to become
members of any 'organization, union or society' which requires 'fees
[or] dues' from its members without first applying for and receiving
from the Mayor and Council of the City a 'permit."' 362 The Court
noted that the city's ordinance made "the peaceful enjoyment of
freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the
uncontrolled will of an official. 363 Consequently, the Court
invalidated the ordinance as an unconstitutional prior restraint on
First Amendment freedoms. 3"
The civil rights movement of the 1960s generated conflicts
between community interests in preserving peace and tranquillity,
and the First Amendment freedom to protest the denial of civil rights
through demonstrations and marches. In Cox v. Louisiana,365 the
Court overturned protest-related convictions for disturbing the peace,
obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse.366
359. Id at 562,
360. See id.
361. 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
362. Id at 321.
363. Id. at 322,
364. See id. at 325 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940)).
365. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
366. See id. at 538. The arrests and convictions had resulted from a civil rights
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Although the Court recognized the inherent right of a government to
regulate the use of public property to assure public safety and
convenience, 367 the Court reversed the conviction because local
officials in Baton Rouge were allowed unfettered discretion in
regulating the use of the streets for peaceful parades and meetings.
3 68
Likewise, in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,369 the Court
reversed the conviction of a civil rights march leader for violating a
Birmingham statute that made illegal the participation in any parade
or other public demonstration without a permit from the Birmingham
City Commission.370 The Court found that the Birmingham ordinance
gave the City Commission nearly unlimited power to restrict such
activity, and that the City Commission's decision was "guided only
by [its] own ideas of 'public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency,
good order, morals or convenience.' 37' The Court held that the
ordinance was unconstitutional because it subjected "the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without
narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing
authority."372
More recently, in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,73 the
Court analyzed and invalidated an ordinance that required the
organizers of public demonstrations to obtain a demonstration permit,
the cost of which was contingent on the stated content of the
demonstration's speech.374 The Nationalist Movement challenged the
demonstration protesting racial segregation. See id.
367. See id. at 554 (citing Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Kunz v. New
York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418
(1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); andLovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)).
368. See id. at 558.
369. 394U.S. 147 (1969).
370. See id. at 148.
371. Id. at 150.
372. Id. at 150-51 (citing Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313,322 (1958)).
373. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
374. See id. at 126-37. The county enacted the ordinance in response to a 1987 civil rights
demonstration that required over $670,000 in police protection. See id. at 126. The high costs
were required to control the one thousand counter-demonstrators, some of whom sporadically
threw rocks at the group of over twenty thousand marchers. See id. at 125-26. In addition, it
took more than three thousand state and local police and National Guardsmen to contain the
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ordinance after the county charged a one hundred dollar fee for the
Movement to demonstrate in opposition to the federal holiday
commemorating Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday.375 Because the
ordinance required a county administrator to examine the content of
the message to be conveyed in order to assess accurately the cost of
security for parade participants, the ordinance could not be analyzed
as a content-neutral regulation. 376 The county argued that its permit
fees were needed to raise revenue, and the Court noted that the
county's purpose was indeed an important interest.377 The Court
found, however, that the county's purpose was not sufficient to
justify a content-based permit fee.378 The Court held that requiring a
permit and fee prior to allowing protected speech constitutes a prior
restraint in violation of the procedural safeguards of Freedman.379
Government officials typically attempt to use permit and license
schemes to control activity that occurs on public streets and
sidewalks. This type of regulation is particularly well suited to a prior
restraint analysis because of the discretionary power that local
ordinances generally grant local officials to control expression.
Nevertheless, all general restrictions on protected First Amendment
activities exercised in a public forum also should be evaluated as a
prior restraint on expression because of their potential to chill
counter-demonstrators. See ud.
375 Although the Movement did not hold the rally or pay the fee, it filed suit challenging
the imposition of the fee. See id. at 127.
376. See id. at 134 (noting that, "[t]hose wishing to express views unpopular with bottle
throwers, for example, may have to pay more for their permit"). But see Northeast Ohio
Coalition for the Homeless v. City of Cleveland, 105 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1996)
(upholding as constitutional a content-neutral ordinance provision for a fifty-dollar license fee
because all street peddlers are required to pay the fee).
377. See Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 136.
378. See id.
379. See id. at 130 ("'[A]ny permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of
speech must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for
communication."); see also Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d
1319, 1327 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that subway system guidelines requiring prior authorization
to engage in noncommercial expressive activity are a prior restraint, but are permissible because
they incorporate the appropriate safeguards); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner,
714 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D.D.C. 1989) (noting that regulation requiring permit for people seeking
to engage in free speech activities on the publicly owned property of Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority is an impermissible prior restraint on protected speech), modified, 893
F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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protected expression.
2. Permits for Free-Standing Newsracks on Public Property
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. ,380 the Supreme
Court held that a city's refusal to allow the distribution of
advertisements through freestanding commercial newsracks located
on public property is a constitutionally impermissible regulation of
commercial speech. 38' The Court's holding relied heavily upon the
fact that the city permitted other commercial publications to remain
on public property.382 The Court recognized that the city had an
important interest in aesthetics, but found that the commercial
newsracks were no greater nuisance than the newsracks that were
permitted to remain on the city's sidewalks.383 The Court rejected the
city's attempt to rely on Renton's secondary effects approach because
any secondary effects caused by the commercial newsracks were
indistinguishable from those caused by the newsracks the city
permitted to remain on the public sidewalks. 384 Moreover, Cincinnati
could not justify its content-based ban on commercial newsracks as a
legitimate time, place, and manner restriction.385 Although the Court
agreed with the city that commercial speech receives a lower level of
constitutional protection, even under the standards of Central Hudson
380. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
381. Seeid.at430.
382. See id.
383. See id. at 425.
384. See id. at 430. But see Graffv. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1319 (7th Cir. 1993)
(comparing the restriction of newsstands in Graffto the Renton and Young cases and arguing
that "[s]urely if a city can restrict speech through the planning, regulation, and zoning of
property because of the secondary effects of adult motion pictures on the neighborhood,
Chicago should be allowed to regulate property on which newsstands could be located"
(citations omitted)).
385. See Discovery Network 507 U.S. at 430. The very basis for the regulation at issue was
"the difference in content between ordinary newspapers and commercial speech." Id. at 429.
For cases involving permit schemes regulating newsracks and other public sidewalk activities,
see One World One Family Now v. City of Key West, 852 F. Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (S.D. Fla.
1994) (finding that an ordinance requiring a permit to operate as a mobile vendor on public
sidewalks is a prior restraint upon speech, and city's aesthetic concerns were not sufficient to
allow abridgment of First Amendment rights); City of Hallandale v. Miami Herald Pub. Co.,
637 So. 2d 929, 932-33 (Fla. App. 1994) (stating that a flat license fee imposed on vending
machines on public property is an invalid prior restraint on First Amendment rights) (citing
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)).
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and Fox, the commercial newsrack ban could not withstand such a
lower level of scrutiny. 86 The Court, therefore, did not decide
whether a content-based restriction of commercial speech "should be
subjected to more exacting review. 387
The Second Circuit also has recently addressed the issue of
governmental restrictions on free expression in public spaces. In Bery
v. City of New York, 38 8 the government restriction at issue was a
"General Vendors Law" that barred "visual artists from exhibiting,
selling or offering their work for sale in public places in New York
City without first obtaining a general vendors license." '389 Although
the court did not employ a prior restraint analysis, it did hold that the
license requirement for selling artwork in public spaces was an
unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment rights.390 The
court noted that it was not clear that the ordinance was content-
neutral because the ordinance distinguished between written and
visual communication and effectively barred an entire medium of
expression-the sale of artwork in public places. 391 However, the
court found that the ordinance would be invalid even under the less
restrictive standard applied to a content-neutral regulation.392 The
Second Circuit noted that regulations that are enacted to control
crowds, prevent congestion, or allow unimpeded passage over public
thoroughfares must (1) be content-neutral, (2) be narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) "'leave open ample
alternative channels for communication.'
393
386. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416 n. 11.
387. Id. Justice Blackmun concurred with the result, but wrote separately to express his
view that the Central Hudson intermediate level of scrutiny was appropriate for a restraint on
commercial speech that is related to time, place, or manner, but "not for a regulation that
suppresses truthful commercial speech to serve some other government purpose." Id. at 431
(Blackmun, J., concurring). But see Rubin v. City of Berwyn, 553 F. Supp. 476, 479 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (stating that requiring a permit to operate a newsstand constitutes a prior restraint and the
"right to sell and disseminate public information is protected by the First Amendment, and any
governmental restriction of this right must be supported by a compelling state interest"), affd,
698 F2d 1227 (7th Cir. 1982).
388. 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996).
389. Id. at 691.
390. See id, at 698.
391. See id. at 696-97.
392. See id. at 697.
393. Id. (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
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Applying the constitutional policy advocated in this Article,
regulations that restrict any protected expression on public
thoroughfares should be invalidated as prior restraints unless they fall
within one of the narrowly defined exceptions.394 If the prior restraint
survives the heavy presumption against constitutionality and satisfies
the examination of procedural safeguards, it must still be evaluated as
either a content-based or content-neutral regulation and appropriately
analyzed under a strict scrutiny or time, place, and manner analysis.
Instead of using local regulations to control crowds, prevent
congestion, and allow passage over public streets and sidewalks,
municipalities should be required to use nuisance law to control
activity that actually interferes with public safety and welfare.395
3. Injunctions Against Certain Public Protests and Gatherings
Another emotion-laden type of land use regulation-restrictions
against antiabortion demonstrations-was at issue in Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, Inc.39 6 In Madsen, the Supreme Court
upheld the provisions of an injunction that established a thirty-six-
foot buffer zone on a public street outside of an abortion clinic in
order to exclude antiabortion demonstrators.397 Analyzing the
injunction as a content-neutral restriction on protected speech, the
Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny with "a somewhat
more stringent application of general First Amendment principles."
398
The Madsen Court rejected the demonstrators' contention that the
injunction restricting only antiabortion protesters' speech was content
or viewpoint based, and that it, thus, required examination of the
injunction under a strict scrutiny standard. 399 The Court explained
394. These exceptions include obscenity and incitement to acts of violence. See, e.g., Board
of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
395. See discussion infra Part VI.
396. 512 U.S. 753 (1994); see also Schenck v. Pro-choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
The Schenck decision will not be discussed because it bears many similarities to the Madsen
case and does not illuminate any of the issues addressed in this Article.
397. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 776.
398. Id. at 765. The Court used this more stringent application because the restriction was
achieved by an injunction rather than a general ordinance. See id.
399. See id. at 762 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
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that if the injunction, on its face, appeared to be viewpoint based, it
was only because all injunctions, by their very nature, must apply to a
particular group.400 Moreover, the Court noted that while the
injunction did not target pro-choice groups, the lack of targeting
could be justly attributed to the lack of previous demonstrations by
pro-choice groups or the lack of any request that such demonstrations
be included in the injunction. 40 ' The Court also refused to adopt a
prior restraint analysis, even though prior restraints historically have
taken the form of injunctions.0 2
An injunction was also at issue in People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna,403
a case involving a new anti-gang weapon based upon public nuisance
law.404 Gang members who were enjoined from "[s]tanding, sitting,
walking, driving, gathering, or appearing anywhere in public view
with any other defendant,4 0 5 along with other restrictions,40 6 argued
that the injunction was "an impermissible prior restraint on their First
Amendment rights of speech and association." 407 Finding that some
of the provisions of the injunction were "unequivocally content-
45 (1983) (holding that a content-based exclusion requires showing that a regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end)).
400. See id.; see also Horizon Health Ctr. v, Felicissimo, 622 A.2d 891, 903 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1993) ("The injunction entered here may not be construed as a content-based
restriction on expression. It must be construed as focusing specifically and exclusively on the
location and manner of expression."), modified, 638 A.2d 1260 (N.J. 1994).
401. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762.
402. See id. at 763-64 n.2. Justice Scalia, in dissent, identified the injunction as a prior
restraint and declared that "the judicial creation of a 36-foot zone in which only a particular
group ... cannot exercise its rights of speech, assembly, and association, and the judicial
enactment of a noise prohibition, applicable to that group and that group alone, are profoundly
at odds with our First Amendment precedents and traditions." Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Appropriately, Justice Scalia argued that the restriction is content-based and deserves the
application of strict scrutiny, and that, therefore, the restriction must be 'necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and ... narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' Id. at 791 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Scalia also asserted that such a content-based restriction may be designed to
suppress ideas rather than achieve a proper governmental goal, see id. at 792, and such a
restriction in the form of "an injunction against speech is the very prototype of the greatest
threat to First Amendment values, the prior restraint." Id. at 797.
403. 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
404. See id. at 602.
405. Id. at 608.
406. See id.
407. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995),
vacated, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
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related,, 40 8 the appellate court noted that the "First Amendment
strictly forbids such restrictions." 40 9 However, the California
Supreme Court held that the activities of the gang and its members
were not protected under the First Amendment because their
activities were not "'private' or 'intimate' as constitutionally
defined"410 within the protected rights of association. 411 This type of
regulation will continue to generate litigation in the future because
other cities have added this "new weapon to [their] arsenal in the war
against gangs."41
2
Certainly, any restriction on First Amendment rights that is based
on the content of the expression, whether it be in the form of a
general ordinance or an administrative or judicial act,413 is a prior
restraint on protected values unless it falls within one of the
exceptions and meets certain procedural safeguards. Courts should
treat as prior restraints any restriction on adult uses, commercial or
noncommercial billboards and signs, or demonstrations that generate
difficulties because of either their secondary effects or the content of
their messages. When labeled as prior restraints, courts will view the
restrictions with a "'heavy presumption' against [their] constitutional
validity."'414 This analytical framework should effectively prevent
constitutional jurisprudence from becoming distorted by cases
involving regulations that affect controversial subject areas such as
pornography, gangs, and abortion.4t 5
408. Id. at 596.
409. Id. (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994)).
410. Gallo, 929 P.2d at 609.
411. Seeid.
412. Gallo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592. See generally Jose Cardenas, Alarcon Proposes Anti-
Gang Injunction, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at Al (Valley edition); Bruce Fein, Weapon in the
Fight Against Street Gangs, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at A12; V. Dion Haynes, L.A. Anti-
Gang Plan, CHI. TRIB., May 30, 1997, at 4; David Rosenzweig & Matea Gold, Sweeping Order
to Limit Activity of l8th Street Gang, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1997, at A1; David G. Savage &
Carla Rivera, Court Upholds Injunction Against Gangs, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1997, at Al.
413. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 797-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the Court that
a different standard should apply to generally applicable legislation than that which applies to
judicial remedies, but arguing that "injunctive relief should be judged by a more lenient
standard than legislation").
414. Id. at798 (citations omitted).
415. See id. at 784-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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IV. PRIOR RESTRAINT AND FREE EXERCISE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution416 supplies
the textual basis for giving religious liberty the same protection that
is afforded to speech, press, assembly, and the right to petition.417 An
historical view of the relationship between the church and state, as it
existed during the time that the First Amendment was drafted and
ratified, reveals that the Framers and other political leaders viewed
freedom of religion as a paramount right.4 18 Indeed, history shows
that the Framers perceived free exercise of religion as part of one's
individual liberty, in accord with the right to free speech and the right
to be free from unjust taking of property.419 However, the Supreme
Court's holding in Employment Division v. Smith42' dramatically
departed from this historical view of First Amendment jurisprudence,
striking an unnecessary blow to religious liberty.42'
In Smith, the Court upheld Oregon's denial of unemployment
compensation to workers who were dismissed after using peyote as
part of their religious practices.422 The Court refused to apply to the
facts of Smith the balancing test set forth in Sherbet v. Verner,
423
416 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
417. See R,. Randall Rainey, Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible?, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 147, 189 (1993) ("even the application of one of the most basic principles of
textual exegesis would give some significance to the location of the religion clauses in the text
of the First Amendment"). But see Leo Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J.
1115, 1121 (1973) (discussing "elevat(ing] free exercise and perhaps establishment values
above all other first amendment claims"); Jennifer E. Spreng, Comment, Failing Honorably:
Balancing Tests. Justice O'Connor and Free Exercise of Religion, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 837,
839 (1994) (suggesting that "[o]nly a jurisprudential principle placing free exercise rights at the
top of the constitutional hierarchy can protect those rights"). Indeed, the "boundaries of
protected free exercise activity should be defined by the boundaries of free speech." William P.
Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE
W. RES. L. REV, 357, 361 (1990) (arguing that religious claims should not be constitutionally
protected "unless protection is also extended to parallel objections based on non-religious
grounds, such as those of moral philosophy").
418. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2185 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
419. See id. (citing P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 17(1964)).
420. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
421. See id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
422. See id. at 890.
423. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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which requires that governmental actions that substantially burden a
religious practice be justified by a compelling governmental
interest.424 The Court held that the Sherbert test should not be used to
analyze free exercise challenges 425 and warned that "[a]ny society
adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but that danger
increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious
beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them."
426
Such dire forecasts by the Court fail to recognize that a
compelling-interest test can be applied to restrict First Amendment
freedoms when society's needs are sufficiently important to justify
such a restriction. Indeed, in her Smith concurrence, Justice
O'Connor's application of the compelling interest test to the denial of
unemployment benefits resulted in the same disposition achieved by
the majority decision.427 The test applied by the Smith majority
ignores the burden that a law places on religious belief, so long as the
law is generally applicable and is not motivated by a governmental
intent to affect religion. Without a compelling interest test, certain
religious practices may be restricted by laws of general application
unless the political process is used to obtain an exemption from the
offending regulation.42 8 Justice Scalia admitted that requiring
legislative action to obtain relief from restrictive regulations will
"place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in, '429 but concluded that such a result is just the
"unavoidable consequence of democratic government. ' '43 Justice
O'Connor, however, expressed the view that "the First Amendment
was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious
practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with
424. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03).
425. See id. at 885.
426. Id. at 887.
427. See id. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
428. See id. at 890 ("Values that are protected against government interference through
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process."); see
also Carrie Johnson, Parish To Go To Court To Save Feeding Plan, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH, June 15, 1997, at A6 (stating that a parish that feeds the homeless despite a city
ordinance that restricts feeding programs in residential districts will have a difficult time
winning its case against the city without the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
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hostility."4 31
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993432 (RFRA) in direct response to the Smith decision.433 Congress
intended that RFRA would "restore the compelling interest test set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened.,,434 However, in City of Boerne v. Flores,435 the Supreme
Court held that Congress exceeded its enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted RFRA.436 As a result, the
Court defeated Congress's attempt to enforce more rigorously the
Free Exercise Clause, and returned First Amendment jurisprudence to
the Smith standard, which does not require courts to make a searching
inquiry into the possibilities of reasonably accommodating religious
practice.4 7 Concurring with the Boerne decision, Justice Scalia
defended his Smith opinion, arguing that the issue presented by Smith
was whether the people or the Court should control the outcome of
cases involving unreasonable burdens on religious practice.438
According to Justice Scalia, the Court's holding in Smith proclaimed
that "[i]t shall be the people. '4 39 It is, thus, ironic that Justice Scalia
elaborated such a defense of his Smith position in the Boerne case for
Boerne was an opinion overturning a Congressional act that was
431. Id at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
432. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
433 See City ofBoeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2160 (1997).
434. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)); see also City ofBoerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
435. 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997).
436 See id. at 2160 (explaining that the Archbishop, in reliance on RFRA, challenged San
Antonio's denial of a building permit to enlarge a church located in a historic district).
Although this Article does not intend to address the correctness of the Court's decision to hold
RFRA unconstitutional, Justice O'Connor's dissent is persuasive on this point in that it points
out a fundamental flaw in the Court's analysis of RFRA, namely, an assumption that Smith
correctly interprets the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 2176-77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id.
at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing strong "doubts about the precedential value of the
Smith rule and its entitlement to adherence. These doubts are intensified ... by the historical
arguments going to the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause presented in
JUSTICE O'CONNOR's opinion ... which raises very substantial issues about the soundness
of the Smith rule.").
437. See id. at 2177 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
438. See id. at 2175-76 (Scalia, J., concurring).
439. Id. at2176.
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enacted by the people "through their elected representatives.
Because the Supreme Court has returned to the constitutional
standard in Smith, which tolerates religious expression "only when it
does not conflict with a generally applicable law,",44' it is necessary to
offer an alternative approach, at least as to land use regulation.
442
Such an approach must support the historical understanding of the
Free Exercise Clause "as an affirmative guarantee for the right to
participate in religious activities without impermissible governmental
interference, even where a believer's conduct is in tension with a law
of general application. '" 3 This Article proposes that similar
principles and standards of constitutional jurisprudence should be
used to evaluate land use regulations that burden any of the rights
protected by the First Amendment. If a zoning regulation is either
generally applied or requires a permit or special exception, and
directly or indirectly impacts First Amendment rights, it should be
treated as a prior restraint. Regulations that act as prior restraints will
be valid only if they fall into one of the narrowly drawn exceptions
and contain sufficient procedural safeguards against official
censorship. A valid prior restraint regulation can then be evaluated as
either a content-based or content-neutral regulation. Zoning
regulations that are content-based or target the exercise of a First
Amendment right must be evaluated using a strict scrutiny standard.
Content-neutral regulations must be examined under a lower level of
scrutiny as time, place, and manner restrictions. While applying this
analysis to land use regulations that allegedly infringe upon religious
440. Id.
441. Id. at 2185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
442. This Article does not suggest that the prior restraint doctrine would necessarily be
applicable to government regulation that is not related to land use. For example, the denial of
unemployment compensation in the Smith decision would not constitute a prior restraint under
the proposed constitutional policy because it is not a land use regulation. See Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 707 (1981) (Jehovah's Witness denied unemployment benefits after he quit
his job because his religious beliefs did not allow him to be involved in the production of war
materials). But see Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 388-92
(1990) (designating as an unconstitutional prior restraint a requirement that an organization pay
a tax prior to engaging in protected activity, but designating as constitutional a requirement that
an organization pay a generally applicable tax on retail sales of religious materials unless the
organization can demonstrate that the mere act of paying such tax violates sincerely held
religious beliefs).
443. City ofBoerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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liberty will require that the Court retreat from its decision in Smith,44
the Court should adopt this approach on the basis that it will better
combat what Justice Scalia has called "the greatest threat to First
Amendment values, the prior restraint. ' 445
A. Prior Restraints on Religious Exercise: Supreme Court Decisions
The prior restraint doctrine has been applied to regulations
impinging on religious freedom. In fact, several of the Supreme Court
cases that have evaluated prior restraints on religious exercise have
involved the religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses.4 6 In
Cantwell v. Connecticut,447 three Jehovah's Witnesses who claimed
to be ordained ministers were arrested after soliciting contributions
for religious publications, including some that attacked the Catholic
religion,448 while going from door to door in a neighborhood where
close to ninety percent of the residents were Roman Catholic. 449 The
three Jehovah's Witnesses were charged under a Connecticut statute
that required them to obtain a certificate before soliciting support for
their views.450 The Supreme Court noted that a general regulation of
solicitation would not be unconstitutional as a prior restraint, even if
it obstructed or delayed the collection of funds for a religious
purpose.451 However, the Connecticut statute required that the
application be approved by an official who was empowered to decide
whether the applicant's cause was religious in nature.452 The Court
444. See Rainey, supra note 417, at 190 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court should begin to
repair the breach between law and religion by abandoning the Smith decision "at the earliest
possible opportunity in favor of religious liberty and its liberal accommodation").
445. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 797 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The term prior restraint is used 'to describe administrative and judicial orders
forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur."' (quoting Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 548
(1993))).
446. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Follett v. Town of
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
447. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
448 See id. at 300-01.
449. See id. at 301.
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held that "[s]uch a censorship of religion as the means of determining
its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First
Amendment .... .43 Although the Court recognized that a state may
regulate the time and manner of solicitation to promote public safety,
peace, comfort, or convenience, it made clear that a state has no
authority to determine what constitutes a legitimate religious cause. 4
Like Cantwell, the case of Cox v. New Hampshire45 involved
several Jehovah's Witnesses who had been convicted of violating a
New Hampshire statute that required individuals to obtain a special
license before parading on a public street.456 The five Jehovah's
Witnesses asserted that they were ordained ministers, that their
purpose in participating in the march was to disseminate information,
and that such dissemination was one of their forms of worship.45 7 The
Court distinguished the statute at issue in Cox from the one at issue in
Cantwell on the basis that the statute in Cox did not interfere with
religious worship or the practice of religion-it was simply an
exercise of local control over the public streets. 58 The statute at issue
in Cantwell, on the other hand, authorized an official to determine
whether a cause was religious and, thus, established a censorship of
religion.459 The Cox Court acknowledged that a municipality's
authority to regulate the use of public highways is consistent with
preserving civil liberties and is indeed one of the means by which a
city may safeguard its citizens and ensure the order upon which the
citizenry ultimately depends.460 As a corollary, noted the court, a
municipality has the authority to regulate the use of public streets as
to time, place, and manner without interfering with any constitutional
right.461 Accordingly, the Cox Court upheld the constitutionality of
453. Id.
454. See id. at 306-07. The Court also reversed the breach of the peace conviction because
it found that Cantwell's playing a phonograph record that attacked the Catholic Church was not
a breach of the peace, even though his communication aroused the animosity of listeners. See
id. at 309-11.
455. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
456. See id. at 570-71.
457. See id. at 573.
458. See id. at 578.
459. See id.
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462the New Hampshire statute.
Once again, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,463 a state court convicted
Jehovah's Witnesses of distributing literature from door to door and
soliciting contributions in violation of a municipal ordinance. 464 The
local ordinance in Murdock required solicitors to pay a license fee as
a condition to pursuing their solicitation activities. 4 65 Unlike the
ordinance in Cantwell, however, the ordinance at issue in Murdock
did not require a determination of whether the cause was religious.
466
Instead, the ordinance was similar to the statute at issue in Cox, in
that it applied generally to anyone wishing to use the public streets.46 7
Nevertheless, the Court in Murdock held that a flat license tax that is
required as a condition to pursuing activities protected under the First
Amendment serves as a prior restraint on the freedoms of press and
religion, and "inevitably tends to suppress their exercise.,
468
In holding that the ordinance constituted a prior restraint, the
Murdock Court distinguished Cox on the basis that the ordinance in
Cox was a "regulation of the streets to protect and insure the safety,
comfort, or convenience of the public,'4 69 while the ordinance at
issue in Murdock "[was] not narrowly drawn to prevent or control
abuses or evils arising from that activity. Rather, it sets aside the
residential areas as a prohibited zone, entry of which is denied
petitioners unless the tax is paid.' '470 While it is difficult to see the
distinction the Court makes between these two cases,471 it is certain
that denying the Witnesses access to residential areas for their
religious practice of solicitation, unless a tax is paid, is a restraint on
462. See id.
463 319U.. 105(1943).
464. See id. at 106-07.
465. See id. at 106.
466. See id.
467. See id.
468. Id. at 114. The Court noted that it was immaterial that the ordinance was
nondiscriminatory on its face. See id. at 115.
469. Id. at 116.
470. Idat117.
471. See id. at 132 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("The sale of these religious books has, we think,
relation to their religious exercises, similar to the 'information march,' said by the Witnesses to
be one of their 'ways of worship' and by this Court to be subject to regulation by license in Cox
v. New Hampshire." (citations omitted)).
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the free exercise of religion.472
The Court confronted yet another Jehovah's Witness's challenge
to a licensing scheme in Follett v. Town of McCormick.473 In Follett,
a Jehovah's Witness had been convicted of distributing books from
house to house and seeking donations in support of his preaching
activities without having first paid a requisite license fee.474 The
Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether a flat license tax as
applied to one who earns his livelihood as an evangelist or preacher
in his home town is constitutional." 75 The Court concluded that if a
license tax on pulpit preachers would be constitutionally invalid, then
the license tax in the case of door-to-door or street preaching must
also fail.
476
The result of the Court's decisions in Murdock and Follett "is that
distribution of religious literature in return for money when done as a
method of spreading the distributor's religious beliefs is an exercise
of religion within the First Amendment and therefore immune from
interference by the requirement of a license. ' 477 Thus, these early
decisions established that even content-neutral, nondiscriminatory
licensing schemes that have the effect of suppressing religious
conduct are invalid as a prior restraint on First Amendment rights.
B. Prior Restraints on Religious Exercise: Lower Court Decisions
Lower courts also have evaluated certain land use regulations as
possible prior restraints on free exercise.478 In International Society
472. See id. at 117.
473. 321 U.S. 573,574 (1944).
474. See id. at 574. The South Carolina Supreme Court had distinguished this case from
Murdock on the basis that "the principle of the Murdock decision was applicable only to
itinerant preachers [and Follett] was not an itinerant but was a resident of the town." Id. at 575.
In addition, the South Carolina Supreme Court had concluded that the "license was required for
the selling of books, not for the spreading of religion." Id. (citations omitted).
475. Id. at 576.
476. See id. at 577.
477. Follett, 321 U.S. at 720 (Reed, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the Court's holding in
Follett, but recognizing the Follett opinion as the "law of the land").
478. See, e.g., Nichols v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 667 F. Supp. 72, 78 (D.C. Conn.
1987) (holding that a regulation requiring residents to obtain a permit before holding prayer
meetings in their home is an unconstitutional prior restraint on religious exercise); Hickey v.
Village of Schaumburg, No. 78-C4427, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10582, at *8 (N.D. Ill. March
13, 1980) (holding that an ordinance requiring a license for soliciting charitable donations is a
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for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) v. Barber,479 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a New York
State Fair rule that prohibited peripatetic solicitations and, thus,
incidentally prevented members of an unorthodox Eastern religion
from engaging in the religious ritual of Sankirtan, was a prior
restraint on religious solicitation.48 0 The court suggested that "resort
to the penal laws, which punish undesirable conduct after it occurs, is
a more appropriate response to ISKCON misconduct than a sweeping
prohibition on all solicitation, fraudulent and nonfraudulent. ' '48'
Similarly, common law nuisance is a more appropriate means of
controlling the undesirable effects of conduct after they occur, rather
than using a sweeping zoning regulation that prohibits offensive as
well as inoffensive land uses.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the
Tenth Circuit also have invalidated certain land use regulations as
prior restraints on religious exercise.482 In Fernandes v. Limmer,483
the Fifth Circuit held that an ordinance requiring licensing for
solicitation constitutes a prior restraint on religious exercise when it
affects a religious group.484 The ordinance at issue in Fernandes
restricted Krishna members from practicing Sankirtan by requiring
that the members purchase a permit prior to soliciting public funds
and distributing literature.485 The Fifth Circuit evaluated the permit
requirement and noted that the "prior restraint doctrine has been
invoked to strike down content-neutral permit systems that regulate
prior restraint on the Unification Church's religious activities); In re American Rescue
Workers, Inc. v. Smith, 228 N.Y.S.2d 85, 90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (holding that a city
ordinance requiring permits for solicitation is an unconstitutional prior restraint on religious
exercise). But see Love Church v. City of Evanson, 671 F. Supp. 508, 512 (N.D. III. 1987)
(finding that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under the prior restraint doctrine because the
challenged zoning ordinance restricting church location options did not restrain plaintiffs from
worshipping), vacated, 896 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1990); Grace Community Church v. Town of
Bethel, 615 A.2d 1092 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992).
479. 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 198 1).
480. See id. at 445 (citing Cantwell and Murdock as precedent).
481. ld.at446.
482. See Femandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981); Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d
477 (10th Cir. 1980), afJ'd, 456 U.S. 951 (1982).
483, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981)
484. See id. at 633.
485. See id. at 623.
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protected First Amendment activities. ',' 48 6 The court then examined
the regulation and found insufficient the procedural safeguards
required under Freedman for such prior restraint permit systems.8 7 In
addition, the court found that the daily permit fee of six dollars was
an unconstitutional tax on free exercise based on the Cox and
Murdock decisions.4 8
Similarly in Espinosa v. Rusk,489 the Tenth Circuit held that an
ordinance requiring an application for a permit was an
unconstitutional prior restraint because it required a government
official to make a determination of whether a cause was religious or
secular.490 Under the ordinance at issue in Espinosa, the Seventh Day
Adventist Church was required to submit an application in order to
obtain a permit for its annual solicitation drive to support activities
such as medical, community, evangelical, and educational services.
491
The city stated that the purpose for the official inquiry was not to
censor activity, but rather to determine the legitimacy of the religious
affiliation, which, in turn, was to prevent fraud and other similar
conduct.492 Nonetheless, the court found that the "conception of
religion entertained by the City in this very case was that it had to be
purely spiritual or evangelical. '493 The court concluded that, as a
result of the city's conception of religion, the city impermissibly
determined that "the charitable activity of the church having to do
with the feeding of the hungry or the offer of clothing and shelter to
the poor was ... subject to regulation. ''494
Unlike Espinosa, in Messiah Baptist Church v. County of
Jefferson,495 the Tenth Circuit distinguished between the regulation of
religious belief and the regulation of religious conduct.496 Using such
486. Id. at 628.
487. See id.
488. See id. at 632-33.
489. 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980), ajfd, 456 U.S. 951 (1982).
490. See id. at 480 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).




495. 859 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1988).
496. See id. at 824.
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an approach, the court analyzed as a regulation of religious conduct
an ordinance requiring a special-use permit for churches.497 Finding
that the construction of a church did not relate to any underlying
religious beliefs of the Baptist Church,498 the court held that the
zoning regulations did not violate First Amendment rights because
there was "no conflict between the zoning ordinances and the
religious tenets or practices of [the Baptist] Church."499
497. See id. ("'[T]he [First] Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute ... "' (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303
(1940)) (alteration in original)). For an extensive commentary on the belief/conduct paradigm,
see generally Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free
Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (1993).
498 Messiah Baptist Church, 859 F.2d at 824.
499 Id. at 825; see also Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v.
City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a city can deny to any religious
group a request to build a house of worship in a residential neighborhood without running afoul
of the First Amendment). The dissent in Messiah Baptist Church, however, argued that the
content-neutral regulation that burdened the church's religious worship should be analyzed
under a time, place, and manner standard, just as when the government prohibits the use of
buildings for live entertainment. See Messiah Baptist Church, 859 F.2d at 828-29 (McKay, J.,
dissenting) (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981)). Suggesting
that courts apply a standard higher than rational basis review to zoning ordinances prohibiting
the use of buildings as churches, the dissent posited an approach that it adopted from a student
comment:
"A better solution would be to acknowledge that zoning ordinances can affect religious
freedom and to subject them to an analysis that explicitly confronts the first
amendment interests at stake. Because zoning regulations do not prohibit belief or
outlaw behavior that is central to any faith, the government should not have to prove a
compelling interest to justify a zoning ordinance. Rather, the analysis appropriate for a
neutral government act, like a zoning ordinance, that restricts religious expression
should be the same as for neutral government acts that circumscribe secular
expression. That analysis, well-established as applied to ordinances regulating the
time, place, and manner of a person's speech, requires that the government justify
every such regulation by proving not only that it serves an important government
purpose, but also that the purpose could not be accomplished by a means less
restrictive of expressive freedom."
Id at 831 (quoting Comment, Zoning Ordinances Affecting Churches: A Proposal for
Expanded Free Exercise Protection, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1131, 1153 (1984) [hereinafter Zoning
Ordinances Affecting Churches]).
A district court in Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654 (D.C.
Minn. 1990), ajd in part. rev 'd in part, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991), similarly suggested that
an ordinance specifying locations in which churches are permitted, but not prohibiting
completely the establishment of churches in the city, should be analyzed as a time, place, and
manner regulation because of its resemblance to the ordinance at issue in Renton. See id. at 660
(citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (finding that an ordinance did not
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Zoning regulations, particularly those that require a special or
conditional use permit, are structurally similar to the licensing
schemes discussed above that have been invalidated as
unconstitutional prior restraints.500 They require a government official
to decide either in advance or on review of an application for a
permit, which religious uses or activities will be permitted in which
areas. Unless the regulation meets the procedural safeguards of
Freedman, there is a danger that officials will use unbridled
discretion to infringe impermissibly on First Amendment rights.
50
'
Courts should, therefore, start with the assumption that a zoning
regulation that has the effect of suppressing religious exercise should
be evaluated under the prior restraint doctrine. If a court decides that
a regulation is a valid prior restraint because it meets the procedural
safeguards of Freedman, this Article proposes that the ordinance
should then be evaluated as a content-neutral time, place, and manner
regulation under an intermediate scrutiny standard similar to the
O'Brien test.
02
C. A New Approach to Analyzing Burdens on Free Exercise
The above decisions illustrate how courts have applied the
doctrine of prior restraint to burdens on religious exercise. Based on
this review, this Article proposes that zoning ordinances of general
ban adult theatres, but merely regulated where they could be located)).
500. See supra notes 178-86, 191-95 and accompanying text.
501. See Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 829 (10th Cir.
1988). As the court stated in Messiah Baptist Church:
The outright prohibition or the discretionary power (unaccompanied by adequate
standards) to deny parade or protest permits on public property surely is not more
odious to the First Amendment than the outright prohibition or legally discretionary
power to deny the right to use buildings for worship, religious communication, and
religious assembly on one's own property.
Id.
502. This analytical structure presumes that the regulation does not directly regulate either
religious belief or religious conduct based on its content. See id. at 825 (finding unconstitutional
zoning regulations that regulate religious beliefs, as opposed to religious conduct, and stating
that .'[i]f the purpose or effect of the law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or
is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though
the burden may be characterized as being only indirect' (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 607 (1961))).
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application, as well as regulations requiring a special exception or
permit, operate as a prior restraint on free exercise when they burden
religious beliefs or practices more than a de minimis amount. As a
prior restraint, the regulation will not be invalid per se, but must fall
within one of the narrowly interpreted exceptions and satisfy the
procedural safeguard requirements of Freedman in order to be
upheld. If the prior restraint is valid, then a court still may invalidate
the restraint if it is content-neutral and impermissibly burdens free
exercise under a time, place, and manner test similar to the one
announced in O'Brien.50  This intermediate scrutiny test for content-
neutral regulation of religious beliefs or practices is less strict than
the Sherbert and Yoder compelling interest test,5°4 but it still would
require a greater level of scrutiny than the courts currently require
under the Smith rational basis test50 5 for those zoning regulations that
are not invalidated as prior restraints. This Article further proposes
that a regulation that targets a belief should continue to be absolutely
prohibited,5°6 and a content-based regulation that targets a particular
religious practice should be subject to strict scrutiny. Such strict
scrutiny requires a compelling governmental interest to justify a
restriction of protected rights.50 7
503. Ifa regulation incidentally affects protected exercise, it is constitutional as long as: (1)
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; (2) it serves an important or substantial
governmental interest; (3) that interest is unrelated to the suppression of free exercise; and (4)
protected exercise is abridged no more than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. See
supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
504. See Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine, 549 F. Supp. 1208, 1217 (D.C. Me. 1982). The
Bangor court stated:
The test presently applied in determining whether regulation of religiously-motivated
conduct violates the free exercise clause contemplates a three-part determination: 1.
whether the challenge is motivated by, and rooted in, a legitimate and sincerely-held
religious belief; 2. whether and to what extent state regulation burdens free exercise
rights; and 3. whether any such burden is justified by a sufficiently compelling state
interest.
Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
505. See supra notes 422-28.
506. See Hamilton, supra note 497, at 747 (discussing the Smith Court's adherence to the
Reynolds rule, which "is the most extreme form of the belief/conduct paradigm: Belief is
absolutely protected; conduct is automatically trumped by the state's interest").
507. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993).
The Hialeah court stated:
[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
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Free exercise of religion warrants at least as much, if not more,
protection from restrictive governmental land use regulation than is
warranted for adult uses or commercial speech. The analysis that the
courts currently apply to content-neutral regulations that impact
religious practices or conduct requires only the lowest level of
scrutiny under Smith. When ordinances impact religious exercise,
courts should apply a constitutional analysis that is parallel to the one
this Article proposes for zoning regulations that burden protected
speech. The prior restraint doctrine is the baseline analysis, but
regulations that survive examination under Freedman's procedural
inquiry should also be subjected to either a strict scrutiny standard,
for content-based regulations, or a time, place, and manner
examination, similar to the O'Brien test, for content-neutral
regulation. However, when the exercise of First Amendment rights
creates actual, rather than anticipated, adverse effects on a
community's peace and order, common law nuisance should be used
as the primary land use control method." 8
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening
a particular religious practice.... A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Spreng, supra note 417, at 848 (discussing United States v.
Carolene Products' "footnote 4" as the justification for strict scrutiny analysis and noting that
Professor Michael McConnell "argues that the Court has never applied a true compelling
interest standard in free exercise cases consistently" (citing Michael McConnell, Should
Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion?,
15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 187-88 (1992))).
508. Using alternative public -remedies to protect the welfare of the community was also
suggested by the Court in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294-95 (1951). In Kunz, a state
court had convicted and fined Kunz, a Baptist minister, for violating a New York City
ordinance that required a permit to be obtained before holding a public worship meeting on the
street. See id. at 290-92. Kunz had applied for and received a permit, but the police
commissioner revoked it after evidence presented at a hearing demonstrated that Kunz had
"ridiculed and denounced other religious beliefs in his meetings." Id. at 292. Kunz applied for a
permit each of the following two years, but the city denied his requests after ascertaining that a
permit had previously been revoked "for good reasons." Id. at 293. Based upon the Supreme
Court's assessment that the ordinance gave "an administrative official discretionary power to
control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the streets of New
York," id., the Court held that the ordinance was "clearly invalid as a prior restraint on the
exercise of First Amendment rights." Id. However, while the Court disallowed the city from
restricting in advance the public worship meetings, the Court suggested that the city should
employ alternative public remedies to protect the welfare of the community in the event that the
meetings resulted in violence. See id. at 294-95 (citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
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V. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,50 9 the Supreme Court
recognized the right of association as a First Amendment right arising
from the freedoms of speech and assembly.510 As the definition of
this right has evolved, the Court has articulated at least three different
aspects of the right to associate or not to associate as follows: (1) the
right to achieve economic or other goals not connected to any
fundamental constitutional right; (2) the right to choose one's spouse
and maintain family and other highly personal relationships, as
protected by the fundamental right to privacy; and (3) the right to
exercise free speech, assembly, and religious liberty within the First
Amendment.5 1 1 Because the right of free association is not absolute,
courts have recognized a continuum of protection that greatly limits
the government's ability to interfere with intimate and personal
gatherings.51 2 This continuum allows less constitutional protection as
a group becomes larger and more open to the community, particularly
when an act of association involves a business organization.
513
A. Applying the Doctrine of Prior Restraint to Associational Rights
Courts have applied the doctrine of prior restraint, albeit
infrequently, to regulations impacting freedom of association.51 4 For
U.S. 697, 715 (1931)). The Court stated without any specificity that "tihere are appropriate
public remedies to protect the peace and order of the community if appellant's speeches should
result in disorder or violence." Id. The Court noted, however, that '"[i]n the present case, we
have no occasion to inquire as to the permissible scope of subsequent punishment."' Id. at 294
(quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 715).
509. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
510. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONDALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.41, at
1118 (5th ed. 1995).
511. See id. at 1118-19. Therefore, if a qualifying association is found, "any activity that
would merit First Amendment protection if engaged in outside the context of the association
will suffice to constitute a right of association." Walker v. City of Kansas City, 911 F.2d 80, 89
& n.1 1(8th Cir. 1990) (explaining also that the right of association is not absolute and may be
subject to countervailing principles that prevail).
512. See Elks Lodge No. 719 v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d
1189, 1195 (Utah 1995).
513. Seeid.
514. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth.,
647 F.2d 332, 334, 336 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that a housing authority rule requiring tenants to
obtain approval before inviting an overnight guest to their home was a prior restraint violating
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example, in Healy v. James,51 5 a group of students wishing to form a
local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society complained that a
state college's refusal to officially recognize the organization was a
denial of their First Amendment rights of expression and
association. 516 The Supreme Court held that by unjustifiably denying
the organization official recognition, the college had infringed upon
the student organization's right to freedom of association. 517 The
Court also noted that the college's decision to deny the students
official recognition was a form of prior restraint because the student
organization was denied the opportunity to engage in associational
activities such as using campus facilities for meetings, using campus
bulletin boards, and having ready access to the school newspaper.
518
While such a restraint may have been justified by the college's
legitimate interest in preventing campus unrest, the court placed on
the college a "heavy burden 519 to show the appropriateness of the
denial of recognition and the existence of procedural safeguards.52°
Another case that illustrates the application of the prior restraint
doctrine to associational rights under the First Amendment is New
York State Association of Career Schools v. State Education
Department (NYSACS II).521 In NYSACS II, the district court
determined that a statute regulating school curricula did not violate
schools' First Amendment rights of freedom of association and
their First Amendment right to freedom of association); Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d
848, 857 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that a university's refisal to recognize Gay Lib as a campus
organization constitutes a prior restraint of the First Amendment right of association); Main v.
University of P.IL, 377 F. Supp. 613, 616-17, 620 (D.P.R. 1973) (holding that suspension under
college rules imposed prior restraints on students' rights to freedom of speech and association
and their right to petition for the redress of grievances). But see New York State Ass'n of
Career Schs. v. State Educ. Dep't, 823 F. Supp. 1096, 1102-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that
curriculum review procedures are prior restraints on schools' freedom of association and
expression, but are constitutionally valid under the four-pronged O'Brien test).
515. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
516. See id. at 170, 177.
517. See id. at 181.
518. See id. at 181, 184.
519. Id. at 184.
520. See id. (citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418 (1971);
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965); and Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697,713-16 (1931)).
521. 823 F. Supp. 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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freedom of speech.522 For the purposes of a summary judgment
motion, the court assumed that the curriculum review procedures
restricted the schools' freedom of association and expression as prior
523
restraints.  However, the court then examined the statute under "the
stringent requirements of the four-pronged O'Brien test 524 to
determine whether these prior restraints were, nevertheless,
constitutionally valid.5 25 Analyzing the statute as content-neutral, the
court determined that: (1) it was within the police power of New
York State to regulate private schools; (2) the interests of the State in
regulating proprietary schools are important and substantial; (3) the
statute was unrelated to the suppression of protected speech; and (4)
the regulatory scheme was narrowly tailored to address the legitimate
interests of the State. 526 In addition to evaluating the statute under the
O'Brien test, the court remarked that suppression of speech and
association under a licensing or regulatory scheme requires a court to
consider both "the scope of the restrictive reach of the scheme 527 and
"the procedural safeguards built into the scheme."528 The court held
that New York's regulatory scheme was not overly broad in scope,
and the appropriate procedural safeguards were built into the
regulatory scheme.
529
The standards that the court in NYSACS II applied to the First
Amendment claim are quite similar to the standards suggested in this
Article. However, this Article proposes that the analysis of a content-
neutral regulatory or licensing scheme that affects First Amendment
rights should begin with the prior restraint doctrine and a review of
the Freedman procedural safeguards. If this analysis results in a
finding that the regulation is a valid prior restraint, only then should it
be subjected to the four-prong O'Brien test. Because few, if any, land
use cases have analyzed as prior restraints zoning restrictions that
affect associational rights, the remainder of this section will focus on
522. Seeid at 1106.
523. Seeid. at 102.
524. Id.
525. See id.
526. See id. at 1102-06 (applying the O'Brien test).
527. Id at 1104 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,222 (1990)).
528. Id. (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)).
529. See id. at 1105-06.
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those zoning decisions that have addressed a general challenge under
First Amendment protection of associational rights.
B. Zoning Decisions Affecting Associational Rights
The landmark case of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas530 involved
a zoning ordinance limiting the use of land in a small village to
single-family dwellings.53' Six college students, not related by blood,
adoption, or marriage, rented and shared a home in the village.532
After receiving an "Order to Remedy Violations" from the village,
the homeowners and three of the tenants brought suit to enjoin the
village from taking further action and to declare the ordinance
unconstitutional.533 The owners and tenants alleged that the ordinance
infringed upon associational rights under the First Amendment.
5 34
The Court upheld the regulation finding that it did not violate the
First Amendment because the ordinance's definition of the term
"family" did not ban "other forms of association, for a 'family' may,
so far as the ordinance is concerned, entertain whomever it likes., 535
In finding the ordinance constitutional, the Court noted the potential
problems that a multi-family dwelling might cause, and concluded
that a city's interest in maintaining quiet neighborhoods falls within
the police power. 36
Courts have continued to reject challenges to zoning regulations
that restrict residential living arrangements when such challenges are
based on alleged violations of associational rights under the First
Amendment.5 37 In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,538 a city housing
530. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
531. See id. at2.
532. See id. at 2-3.
533. See id. at3.
534. See id. at 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
535. Id. at 9. In his dissent, Justice Marshall viewed the classification that resulted from the
ordinance's definition of "family" as a burden on the students' fundamental rights of
association and privacy. See id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that the
Court should have judged the regulation according to the strict scrutiny standard rather than the
rational basis standard. See id.
536. See id. at 8-9.
537. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Butler, 8 F.2d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 1989) (denying freedom of
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ordinance limited the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of the
same family. The city convicted Moore of violating the ordinance on
the basis that her son and two grandsons lived with her and did not
fall within the ordinance's definition of "family.' 539 The Court
refused to apply either Belle Terre or Euclid because the city's
ordinance was such an intrusive regulation of the family that it did
not justify the normal standard of deference to the legislature.5 40 The
Court invalidated the ordinance as a violation of substantive due
process because "the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition. '54' Although the majority did not
respond to Moore's claim that the ordinance violated her right of
association, Justice Stewart in his dissent remarked that "[t]o suggest
that the biological fact of common ancestry necessarily gives related
persons constitutional rights of association superior to those of
unrelated persons is to misunderstand the nature of the associational
freedoms that the Constitution has been understood to protect.,
542
Instead, associational rights are for purposes relating to the promotion
of speech, assembly, the press, or religion and "do not extend to those
who assert no interest other than the gratification, convenience, and
economy of sharing the same residence."
5 43
1. Group Homes
Group homes generally have been unsuccessful in claiming
constitutional protection from zoning regulation based on freedom of
association.544 Communities typically oppose group homes because
538. 431 U.S. 494(1977).
539. See id. at 497-98.
540. See id at 499.
541. Id at 503.
542. Id. at 535 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
543. Id. at 535-36.
544. See, e.g., City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 159 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding that religious family households associated with a Baptist church violated a zoning
ordinance requiring conditional use and were not protected by the constitutional right of
association based on the Belle Terre decision), vacated, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981); Association for Educ. Dev. v. Hayward, 533 S.W.2d 579, 587-88 (Mo. 1976) (holding
that use of a group home by laymen, who have as their common tie a religious motivation, but
whose use is not necessarily incidental to that of a church, is not a use protected by the
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
82 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
of economic, safety, and aesthetic concerns. 545 Although many
studies have shown that there is no basis for these concerns,
communities continue to discriminate against the handicapped and
other nontraditional households. 46  Zoning power exercised to
preserve the "character of the community" thus becomes "a
regulatory tool shaping not only the physical character of the
neighborhood, but 'the socioeconomic character of a community' as
well. 547 For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,548 the city denied a group home for the mentally retarded a
special use permit because the Cleburne City Council was concerned
about the negative attitudes and fears of the neighboring property
owners.549 Although the Court held that mental retardation is not a
quasi-suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause,550 it
nevertheless found that, under a rational basis review, the city's
denial of the special permit was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.55 ' Because the litigants did not present a claim for violation
of their associational rights, the Court did not discuss that issue.
constitutional right of association). But see Alber v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities, 786 F. Supp. 1340, 1347, 1375 (N.D. I11. 1992) (determining that a
married couple living together on a family farm with their natural minor child, an adult with
cerebral palsy who was adopted when he was eleven years old, and two adopted adults afflicted
with Downs Syndrome, constituted a constitutional "family" for purposes of asserting a claim
for freedom of association); Zavala v. City and County of Denver, 759 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1988)
(remanding the case to determine whether a zoning ordinance restricting family dwellings to
related people deprived an unmarried couple of their associational rights); New Jersey v. Baker,
386 A.2d 890 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (reversing convictions of a minister who
violated a zoning ordinance that limited the number of unrelated people living together on the
basis that the ordinance's definition of family impermissibly infringed on freedom of
association under the New Jersey State Constitution), aff'd, 405 A.2d 368 (N.J. 1979).
545. See Cindy Lee Soper, Note, The Fair Housing Act Amendments of1988: New Zoning
Rules for Group Homes for the Handicapped, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1033, 1041 (1993).
546. See id. at 1041-42; see also City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725
(1997) (finding that "Edmonds' zoning code provision describing who may compose a 'family'
is not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA" and leaving lower courts to
decide whether a city's actions against a house sheltering recovering alcoholics and drug
addicts violates the FHA's discrimination prohibitions).
547. J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761, 777-78
(1982) (quoting James F. Blumstein, A Prolegomenon to Growth Management and
Exclusionary Zoning Issues, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11 (1979)).
548. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
549. See id. at 448.
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In Doe v. City of Butler,552 however, the litigants did assert a
violation of their right to freedom of association." 3 In Butler, a city
ordinance placed a six-resident limitation on transitional dwellings,
making it infeasible to operate a shelter for abused women and their
children.554 The women claimed that "the residency limit adversely
affect[ed] their right to live in a dwelling with other battered women
through which they could get sustenance from each other and
counseling for all."' 555 In denying this claim, the court echoed the
rationale expressed by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Moore: "[t]he
right to association ... does not reach as far as plaintiffs suggest.,
556
The court relied on Belle Terre and explained that "[t]he zoning
occupancy limitation challenged here does nothing to prevent
plaintiffs from associating with each other, and with others similarly
situated. It merely provides that for zoning purposes, a reasonable
occupancy limit must be observed.,
557
2. Non-Residency Association Claims
Claims of a constitutional right to free association in zoning cases
involving uses other than group homes also have been
unsuccessful.5 In City of Dallas v. Stanglin,559 the Supreme Court
552. 892 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1989).
553. See id. at 316.
554. See id at 322.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 323.
558. See, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, I 1 F.3d 488, 495 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that it is
questionable whether a fundamental right of association is implicated by curfew ordinance
restricting minors, but even if it is, "[this] curfew ordinance satisfies strict scrutiny, and any
negligible burden on the individual's right to associate is outweighed by the compelling
interests of the state"); Walker v. City of Kansas City, 911 F.2d 80, 95 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding
zoning ordinance restricting semi-nude dancing in drinking establishment is not a burden on
freedom of association); Greene v. Town of Blooming Grove, 483 F. Supp. 804, 806, 808
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating in dictum that zoning ordinance requiring landowner to obtain a
permit before holding a three-day rock concert on his property does not infringe on his
constitutional rights of expression and association); People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d
596, 597 (Cal. 1997) (holding that a gang statute does not violate associational rights under the
First Amendment because gang members are free to gather outside the restricted area); City of
Los Altos v. Barnes, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 82-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a zoning
ordinance restricting home occupation in a residential area does not violate constitutionally
protected rights of privacy or association); Elysium Inst., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 283
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upheld a Dallas ordinance that restricted admission to certain dance
halls to persons between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.5 60 The
owner of a skating rink, which required a dance hall license, sued to
enjoin the city from enforcing the age and hour restrictions of the• 561
ordinance. In holding that the First Amendment does not secure
any right for minors to associate with older persons,5 62 the Supreme
Court discussed two distinct views on the right of association. First,
the Court noted that "'freedom of association receives protection as a
fundamental element of personal liberty.' 563 Second, the Court stated
that the right to associate is recognized "'for the purpose of engaging
in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion.",'564 Finding that the dance-hall patrons "are not engaged in
the sort of 'intimate human relationships' referred to in Roberts"
565
and that "the activity of these dance-hall patrons-coming together to
engage in recreational dancing-is not protected by the First
Amendment ' 566 and, therefore, is not a form of "'expressive
association' as those terms were described in Roberts,"5 67 the Court
held that the Constitution does not recognize a generalized right of
'social association' that includes chance encounters in dance
halls."5 68 Accordingly, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Dallas ordinance.569
Cal. Rptr. 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a county zoning ordinance restricting nudist
camps does not unconstitutionally restrain federal and state constitutional rights of free
expression, freedom of association, privacy, and personal liberty); cf Cornerstone Bible Church
v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 474 n.19 (8th Cir. 1991) (on appeal from the district court's
summary judgment ruling against the church, the church did not raise its freedom of association
claim based on a zoning ordinance excluding churches).
559. 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
560. See id. at 20,28.
561. See id. at 20. The Texas Court of Appeals upheld the hour restrictions, but invalidated
the age restrictions as a violation of the First Amendment associational rights of minors. See
744 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
562. See 490 U.S. at 20-2 1.
563. Id. at 24 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984)).
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 25.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. See id. at 28.
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Before the Supreme Court decided Stranglin, the Ninth Circuit
declined to find either an intimate or expressive association
relationship between an escort and a client in IDK, Inc. v. County of
Clark,570 a case involving the regulation of escort services and their
employees.5 71 Although the court concluded that dating and other
social activities may be protected constitutionally because of their
value as intimate and expressive associations, the escort services
lacked the "constitutional aspects of intimate associations. 572
Therefore, the escort services could not be protected as expressive
associations because their "activities and purposes are primarily
commercial rather than communicative." 573 The court held that the
licensing regulation did not operate as a prior restraint on expression
because "the activities of the escort services and their employees do
not implicate substantial First Amendment rights. 574
C. The Prior Restraint Approach to Associational Claims
Case law is not available to illustrate this Article's proposed
analytical approach to First Amendment claims as it relates to right of
association claims.575 However, the right of association is so closely
tied to the right of free speech, and other First Amendment rights,
that it should not be difficult for courts to adapt and apply this
Article's proposed analytical framework to zoning regulations that
burden associational rights. Such an adaptation may prove
unnecessary, however, because in most cases, courts will likely
resolve a right of association claim as a free speech issue. For
570. 836 F.2d 1185, 1196 (9th Cir. 1988).
571, See836F.2d 1185.
572. Id. at 1196.
573. Id.
574. Id. But see id at 1199 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (stating that the "[I]ieensing scheme,
because it is targeted directly at people's ability to associate with one another, regulates
constitutional freedom of association and should therefore be carefully scrutinized").
575. But see id. at 1201-04 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (analyzing the licensing scheme as a
prior restraint and applying a compelling state interest and least restrictive means test to
invalidate the regulation); Walker v. City of Kansas City, 911 F.2d 80, 98 (8th Cir. 1990) (Lay,
J, dissenting) (noting that the district court found the land use ordinance at issue
unconstitutional under rules of prior restraint and that the Eighth Circuit improperly reversed
the district court by upholding the ordinance under the Twenty-first Amendment using City of
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), which was based on a right of association claim).
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example, in Grace Community Church v. Town of Bethel,576 a church
requested a declaratory judgment that a zoning regulation requiring a
special permit to build a church in certain zones was a prior restraint
on the free exercise of religion.57 7 As part of its free exercise claim,
the church alleged that the special permit provisions resulted in a
denial of its constitutional rights of assembly, association, and free
speech. 78 The Appellate Court of Connecticut found that the Town
of Bethel had an important interest in protecting the residential
character of its neighborhoods and promoting the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens.579 The court noted that the zoning regulation at
issue was completely free of any reference to religious practices and,
thus, found that the regulation was content-neutral.5 80 Because the
regulation was content-neutral, and the town had a legitimate interest
in promoting its purpose, the court held that the statute did not violate
the First Amendment rights of assembly, association, and free
speech.
581
Another example of a right of association claim being analyzed as
a free speech issue can be found in C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago.52 In
C.L. U.B., an organization whose purpose was "to challenge zoning
laws restricting the free exercise of religion and other freedoms of its
members and of people of all faiths"583 challenged a zoning
regulation requiring the builders of churches, but not other
organizational buildings, to obtain a special use permit before
building a church in certain zones within the city.584 For the purposes
of its analysis, the court treated alike the plaintiffs First Amendment
claims for freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. 85 The court
576. No. 306994, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2131 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 16, 1992), affd,
622 A.2d 591 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
577. See id. at *2.
578. See 622 A.2d at 595-96.
579. See id. at 596.
580. See id. The court noted that the statute applied equally to churches, clubs, schools, and
other organizations. See id.
581. Seeid. at595-96.
582. No. 94-C6151, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2230 (N.D. Ii. Feb. 27, 1996) (memorandum
opinion and order granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion to dismiss).
583. Id. at *40.
584. See id. at *78-79.
585. See id. at *75 (citing New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13
(1988), andNAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958)).
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supported this merging of the free speech and free association
analysis by reference to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in New
York State Club Ass 'n v. City of New York,586 in which the Court
stated that "[t]he ability and the opportunity to combine with others
to advance one's views is a powerful practical means of ensuring the
perpetuation of the freedoms the First Amendment has guaranteed to
individuals as against the government." 587 Recognizing that a
content-neutral regulation of church locations would be analyzed as a
time, place, and manner restriction under Renton's secondary effects
approach, the C.L.U.B. court found that the special use permit
requirement was not content-neutral. 588 The court, thus, refused to
dismiss the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims.589
Infringements on the First Amendment right of association by
zoning regulations are analogous to issues involving free speech and
religious exercise. Such infringements should, therefore, be analyzed
according to the structure proposed earlier in this Article for free
speech and religious exercise infringements. Infringements on
associational rights should be considered prior restraints that may be
valid if there is a finding that appropriate procedural safeguards exist.
If the regulation is not invalid as a prior restraint, but is content-based
and targets associational rights, it must be invalidated unless there is
a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved by less restrictive
means. If the zoning regulation is not invalid as a prior restraint, but
is content-neutral, it should be analyzed under the O'Brien test as a
time, place, and manner restriction aimed at secondary effects.
Assuming, however, that a zoning regulation directed at secondary
effects is invalidated as a prior restraint, the community is not
without a remedy for abating any actual adverse effects that do occur.
Common law nuisance claims can be used to resolve land use
conflicts between First Amendment rights and the police power to
regulate the public health, safety, and welfare of the community.
586. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
587. Id. at 13 ('"Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than
once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and
assembly."' (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460)).
588. See CLUB at*76-78
589. See id. at *75-79.
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VI. NUISANCE AS A REMEDY AND AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
REGULATION
When a government's attempt to regulate land use is unsuccessful
due to conflicts with First Amendment rights, nuisance law is
available as an alternative system of controlling activities that
adversely affect either the public good or private property rights of
use and enjoyment. Common law nuisance arose in thirteenth-century
England as a criminal writ for "invasions of the plaintiff's land due to
conduct wholly on the land of the defendant."5 9 Eventually, this writ
was superseded by the common law action for nuisance, which
became the remedy for an interference with the use or enjoyment of
land.59'
In the United States, nuisance law was used extensively by
landowners during the 1920s and 1930s to enjoin actual or threatened
deleterious uses in their communities.5 92 These cases created an
expensive litigation process that, along with confusion about the
basic principles of nuisance,593 led to the expectation that public
regulation systems, such as zoning, would solve land use control
issues.594 Zoning was indeed upheld as constitutional in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,595 bolstered by the understanding that
such regulation would operate to control nuisances such as apartment
buildings in residential neighborhoods. 96
A. Nuisance as a Remedy for Harm Created by Protected Activities
This section will explore the efficacy of using nuisance law as an
alternative method of land use control when zoning regulation
operates as a prior restraint on protected First Amendment
activities.597 This section will evaluate the use of both public and
590. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 86, at 617 (5th ed. 1984).
591. Seeid.
592. See Ellickson, supra note 6, at 721.
593. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 590, at 616 ("There is perhaps no more impenetrable
jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.").
594. See Ellickson, supra note 6, at 722.
595. 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
596. See id. at 394-95.
597. The author accepts as valid the arguments that using nuisance law merely transfers
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private nuisance law based upon decisions that have weighed
protected personal rights against public health, safety, and welfare
concerns. Likewise, this section will discuss briefly the economic
efficiency of using nuisance law rather than zoning regulation by
examining proposals that have advocated alternative land use control
methods.598 This section proposes that a nonzoning system may be
just as efficient as a zoning system at allocating land uses and notes
that "zoning does not guarantee either elimination or internalization
of nuisance costs.
59 9
1. Public vs. Private Nuisance
As a method of land use regulation, nuisance law typically has
taken the form of public nuisance actions used to protect the
community good under the aegis of police power. Nevertheless,
private nuisance actions also can be an effective means of controlling
undesirable local uses that have adverse effects. These two forms of
nuisance law, and the fact that they "have almost nothing in common,
except that each causes inconvenience to someone,' 600 have
generated confusion and uncertainty as to the exact definition of
nuisance.
60 1
Public nuisance is broader than private nuisance and includes
"unbridled discretion" from government officials to the courts, and that the existence of
potential liability under nuisance could arguably "chill" First Amendment activity even more
than it is "chilled" by advance regulation because nuisance liability and litigation costs are less
predictable than the regulatory guidance of land use activities.
598. Certainly zoning has been misused, not only to inhibit First Amendment rights, but
also to protect individual property interests by actions such as stopping or slowing local
development. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise
Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 79 (1981).
599. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 694.
600. KEETON ET AL., supra note 590, § 86, at 618. As Professor Keeton has explained:
A private nuisance is a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of rights in land. The
remedy for it lies in the hands of the individual whose rights have been disturbed. A
public or common nuisance, on the other hand, is a species of catch-all criminal
offense, consisting of an interference with the rights of the community at large, which
may include anything from the obstruction of a highway to a public gaming-house or
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conduct other than that which interferes with the use and enjoyment
of private property.6 °2 Conduct that interferes with the public health,
safety, or general welfare may be considered criminal and punishable
as such,60 3 or may generate tort liability for harm sustained by the
general public. 6°4 A public official may seek redress for a public
nuisance, but an individual acting in a personal capacity may bring
suit only if he or she can show that his or her damage is
distinguishable from "that sustained by other members of the general
public. '605 In other words, "a private individual cannot complain of
public nuisance either by way of maintaining a tort action for
damages or by way of obtaining an abatement of the so-called
nuisance unless the conduct has resulted in the commission of an
independent tort to the plaintiff., 60 6 In determining whether the tort
against the individual is identical to the tort against the public, it is
necessary to examine the social interest that public nuisance law
protects.
To determine whether a social interest protected by public
nuisance law is independent of a private interest protected by tort
law, public nuisances can be classified based on the individual
interests that they affect.60 7 For example, the social interest protected
by public nuisance in many First Amendment cases is morality.608 In
such cases, activities are considered a nuisance "because of their
possible effect on the morals of the people, such as houses of
prostitution, obscene movies, and massage parlors., 60 9 However,
because "[t]he law of torts does not attempt to give redress to those
who have been led into sin by watching obscene pictures or using
massage parlors,"610 private individuals will not suffer a tort
independent of the public interest in protecting morality and, thus,
602. See id. § 90, at 643.
603. See id. at 645.
604. See id. at 646.
605. Id.
606. Id. at 650-5 1.
607. See id. at 651 (applying such a classification scheme to the example of an obstruction
that interferes with freedom of travel on a highway or sidewalk).
608. See id.
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will not be able to bring suit for a public nuisance.6 1' However, the
location of these uses may constitute a common law private nuisance
if such uses interfere with the use and enjoyment of private
property.612
A common law private nuisance is actionable in tort when a party
interferes with the use and enjoyment of another's land in a manner
that is either intentional and unreasonable, or negligent, reckless, or
abnormally dangerous.61 a Determining that such conduct constitutes a
private nuisance requires that the interference be "substantial and
unreasonable, and such as would be offensive or inconvenient to the
normal person." 614  The requirement that the interference be
unreasonable refers to the interference itself, not to the defendant's
conduct. 615 An unreasonable interference occurs "'where the harm or
risk to one is greater than he ought to be required to bear under the
circumstances, at least without compensation.' 616 This definition
requires a balancing of factors to determine whether the gravity of the
harm outweighs the utility of the conduct.1 A substantially similar
analysis may be used by courts to determine liability for a public
618




614. Id. § 87, at 620.
615. See id. at 623.
616. Id. § 88, at 629 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt.j (1977)).
617. See id. at 630. Professor Keeton suggests six balancing factors:
(1) the amount of the harm resulting from the interference; (2) the relative capacity of
the plaintiff and the defendant to bear the loss by way of shifting the loss to the
consuming public at large as a cost of doing business or by other means such as some
type of insurance; (3) the nature of the plaintiff's use of his property; (4) the nature of
the defendant's use of his property; (5) the nature of the locality; and (6) priority in
time as to the respective activities of the plaintiff and the defendant in the area.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827(a) (1977). The Restatement (Second)
states that the factors to be weighed in assessing gravity of harm to plaintiff versus utility of
defendant's conduct include: extent and character of harm involved; social value of the interest
invaded; suitability of the use to the character of the locality; burden on the injured person of
avoiding harm; social value of the offending conduct; suitability of the conduct to the character
of the locality; and impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion. See id.
618. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604-05 (Cal. 1997) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977)).
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actionable, either damages or injunctive relief may be granted to
remedy the interference with private rights.619 When injunctive relief
is sought, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct is
unreasonable and that damages do not furnish an adequate remedy.620
Although some courts have required issuance of an injunction at this
point, "the modem and best approach is to grant the equitable remedy
of injunctive relief [only] when the gravity of the harm from the
activity exceeds the utility of the conduct."621 If a court finds that the
utility of the conduct outweighs the harm, the court may choose not
to grant injunctive relief.622 However, courts typically will award
damages when a defendant's conduct is so unreasonable that he or
she should pay for the harm. 623 Equitable relief in the form of an
injunction may be granted based on a threat of harm that has not yet
occurred; 624 however, it must be highly probable that an activity will
619. See KEETON ETAL.,supra note 590, §§ 87, 88A.
620. Seeid. § 88A, at 631-32.
621. Id. at 632; see also George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an
Historical Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658,
689-90 (1995) (explaining that most state courts use a balancing test when deciding whether to
grant injunctive relief for nuisance and focus on "the character of the conduct of the parties, the
relative economic costs to the parties, and the impact on the community and the general public
of the grant or denial of an injunction").
622. See KEETON El AL., supra note 590, § 89, at 641.
623. See id. Indeed, commentators generally recognize at least four remedial options from
which courts may choose when resolving nuisance disputes. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed were the first in a line of scholars to explain these options in terms of the competing
rules of property and liability. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear iew of The Cathedral: The
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2091-93 (1997) (citing Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972)). As such, a court may choose to avail itself of one
of four altematives when adjudicating a nuisance action: (1) a court may grant an injunction; (2)
a court may grant damages; (3) a court may permit a defendant to continue the challenged
activity without awarding plaintiff any remedy; or (4) a court may grant an injunction to the
plaintiff, but require the plaintiff to pay the defendant to cease the challenged activity (or to pay
for something such as relocation costs). This fourth approach was, and perhaps still is, relatively
revolutionary. See Epstein, supra, at 2091-93; James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, The
Cathedral at Twenty-Five: Citations and Impressions, 106 YALE L.J. 2121, 2121-22 (1997);
Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2149, 2150-53 (1997). The most famous case applying the fourth altemative is Spur
Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972) (holding that a housing
developer could enjoin the operations of a cattle feedlot, which was present before the
development's inception, but requiring the developer to compensate the feedlot for shutdown
costs).
624. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 590, § 89, at 640. But see supra note 69 and
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lead to nuisance before a court may issue an injunction.625 If the
possibility of nuisance is uncertain or contingent, a court may require
the plaintiff to wait until after the threatened nuisance has occurred
before seeking damages.626
The use of private nuisance by individuals raises interesting
questions about how to approach First Amendment rights. Most of
the issues involving the intersection of torts and the First Amendment
have arisen in the area of the communicative torts such as libel and
the right of privacy.627 However, it is not difficult to imagine how
First Amendment concerns could be handled in a private nuisance
action. In determining whether or not an interference with an
individual's use and enjoyment of his or her land is unreasonable, one
of the factors that must be considered is the social value of the
defendant's conduct. If the defendant's activities are an exercise of
protected First Amendment rights, then the balance may tip in favor
of finding the interference to be reasonable under the circumstances;
however, if the defendant's activities involve adult uses, a court may
find that even First Amendment protection does not raise the social
accompanying text (discussing injunctive relief as a prior restraint on First Amendment
freedoms).
625. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 590, § 89, at 640.
626. Seeid.at641.
627. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); Stanley Ingber,
Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 847 (1985) ("The
Restatement (Second) of Torts attempts to limit the impact upon first amendment values by
specifically exempting from liability published materials of 'legitimate public interest."');
Jonathan L. Kranz, Sharing the Spotlight: Equitable Distribution of the Right of Publicity, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 917, 938 n. 119 (1995) ('"Usually, torts of public disclosure and
false light are found to conflict with the First Amendment because of the impact upon
dissemination of information to the public."' (quoting Michael .Rudell, Refusal to Enjoin:
Elizabeth Taylor v. Miniseries, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1994, at 3)); John W. Wade, The
Communicative Torts and the First Amendment, 48 MISS. L.J. 671 (1977); Steven J.
Weingarten, Note, Tort Liability for Nonlibelous Negligent Statements: First Amendment
Considerations, 93 YALE L.J. 744 (1984); Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy
Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64
IOWA L. REv. 185, 187 (1979) (tracing the "historical development of the right to privacy and
the common law public disclosure action'); see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 265 (1965) (holding that it is irrelevant that a law which is claimed to restrict freedom of
speech is applied in a civil action and is only common law: "[the] test is not the form in which
state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been
exercised").
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value of the conduct, that is generally disfavored by the community,
to a level deserving protection. If the remedy sought is injunctive
relief, then the balancing of harm against the utility of the conduct
should also include a similar consideration of First Amendment
rights.
A legislature may prohibit certain conduct by declaring it a
punishable and enjoinable public nuisance or a tortious private
nuisance. Alternatively, a legislature may authorize activity that
normally constitutes a public or private nuisance by permitting the
activity under a zoning ordinance or a licensing scheme.628 Although
such authorizing legislation generally does not shelter an activity
from a nuisance claim, the authorization of a specific use "would
seem to be a declaration that it is in the public interest for the activity
to be conducted at that particular place." 629 Legislative action,
however, is subject to normal constitutional constraints, including
First Amendment protection. 61 Indeed, "[i]n the public nuisance
context, the community's right to security and protection must be
reconciled with the individual's right to expressive and associative
freedom. 63'
2. Public Nuisance as a Prior Restraint
The common law of public nuisance may not be used "both to
define the standards of protected speech and to serve as the vehicle
for its restraint., 632 The Supreme Court's most important opinion on
the prior restraint doctrine, Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
633
involved an injunction used to abate as a public nuisance a newspaper
that published malicious attacks on grand jurors and city officials.634
The Court held that a statute that enjoins as a nuisance the publication
628. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 590, § 88B, at 632-33.
629. Id.
630. See id; see also Jennifer L. Radner, Comment, Phone, Fax and Fnstration:
Electronic Commercial Speech and Nuisance Law, 42 EMORY L.J. 359, 391 (1993) ("[W]hen
nuisance law is used in prevention of core First Amendment free speech rights, courts have not
reached a consensus as to the propriety of the doctrine's applicability.").
631. People exrel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596,603 (Cal. 1997).
632. Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82, 88 (3d Cir. 1969).
633. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
634. See id. at 702-03.
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of a malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper, magazine, or
other periodical, is invalid because the injunction would virtually
censor the periodical's publisher635 and operate as a prior restraint.636
After the Near decision, many courts treated all injunctions as
prior restraints and grouped them "together with licensing systems
for special disfavored treatment under the First Amendment."
637
Grouping injunctions with licensing systems is appropriate because
"they both must rely upon adjudication in the abstract, they both
encourage regulatory agents to overuse the power to regulate, and
they both adversely affect audience reception of controversial
messages., 638 Therefore, injunctions and licensing systems, as the
two principal methods of prior restraint, should be disfavored.639
Nevertheless, nuisance actions that are based on actual harm, rather
than the threat of harm, should be used in place of zoning regulation
because zoning regulation also acts as a prior restraint when it
restricts First Amendment activity.
While public nuisance is often used as a tool to regulate morality
in a community, injunctions and abatement actions based on nuisance
will collide with the doctrine of prior restraint when they attempt to
regulate future conduct. 640 For example, in Cinevision Corp. v. City of
635. Seeid. at 713.
636. See id. at 723.
637 Blasi, supra note 69, at 13.
638. Id. at 92-93.
639. See id. at 93.
640. See, e.g., Leonardson v. City of East Lansing, 896 F.2d 190, 198-99 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that an ordinance permitting the use of police lines to prevent a "drunken, raucous
semi-annual event" as a public nuisance is a prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment
rights of speech and association); City of New York v. Allied Outdoor Adver., Inc., 659
N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that a public nuisance abatement action against owners and
operators of a billboard sign and structure is unconstitutional because it favors onsite
commercial advertising over noncommercial messages); State ex rel. Eckstein v. Video
Express, No. CA96-05-104, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1692, *17-18 (Ohio Ct. App. April 29,
1997) (holding that a public nuisance abatement order against a videotape rental store is an
unconstitutional prior restraint); City of Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242, 243 (Or. 1988)
(holding that a public nuisance injunction against adult bookstores is an invalid restraint on free
expression). See generally Steven T. Catlett, Note, Enjoining Obscenity as a Public Nuisance
and the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1616 (1984); Smith, supra note 46;
William J. Boyce, Note, Restraining Prior Restraint, or a Call for Balancing in Evaluating
Obscenity Abatement Statutes: City of Paducah v. Investment Entertainment, Inc., 82 Nw. U. L.
REv. 181 (1987).
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Burbank,641 the Ninth Circuit held that the City of Burbank violated
Cinevision's First Amendment rights when it refused to allow certain
performers to use the municipally owned amphitheater. 642 The refusal
was unconstitutional because it was based on "the content of the
performers' expression and other arbitrary factors' '643 such as the
"lifestyle or race of the crowd that a performer would attract." 644 In
City Council meetings, some Council members expressed an
assumption that all hard rock concerts are a public nuisance.64' The
court rejected the city's suggestion that "hard rock" concerts are a per
se public nuisance and found that "a general fear that state or local
narcotics or other laws will be broken by people attending the
concerts cannot justify a content-based restriction on expression. ''646
Thus, the court did not allow the city to regulate protected First
Amendment rights in advance of encountering actual adverse effects
created by the presence of certain performers.
647
The use of public nuisance abatement power to control obscenity
was scrutinized by the Sixth Circuit in City of Paducah v. Investment
Entertainment, Inc.648 Finding "no precedent in which courts have
upheld an obscenity law that provided for the revocation of obscenity
dealers' business licenses," 649 the court held that Paducah's license
revocation ordinance, which was based on public nuisance, was a
prior restraint on freedom of expression.650 The city's use of license
revocation was for the impermissible purpose of controlling "future
641. 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984).
642. See id. at 577.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. See id. at 572.
646. Id.
647. See id. at 577. As the Oregon Supreme Court said in City of Portland v. Tidyman, 759
P.2d 242 (Or. 1988), "Expression that is offensive to many is likely also to be seen as harmful,
and there is little political incentive to repeal laws made in apprehension of harm from offensive
expression when the danger fails to materialize.... Thus, it is important that the constitutional
guarantee restricts lawmakers . I... d  at 250.
648. 791 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1986).
649. Id. at 467.
650. See id. at 470. The court observed that federal and state courts have addressed the
First Amendment concerns presented by the use of laws and local ordinances designed to abate
public nuisances. See id. at 467 (discussing laws that abate nuisances by revoking the general
business license of the offending business and the so-called padlock laws that use temporary or
permanent injunctions to close the business).
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expression by businesses that have been subjected to the nuisance
abatement procedure,"65' and, as a prior restraint, it did not contain
the procedural safeguards required by the Supreme Court in
Freedman v. Maryland.652
When public nuisance law is used to remedy a circumstance in
which protected First Amendment activity has already caused a harm,
courts generally have upheld the use of remedies such as abatement,
forfeiture, and injunctive relief.653 For example, in Arcara v. Cloud
Books, Inc.,654 the Court sustained an order issued under a general
nuisance statute that closed down an adult bookstore that was being
used for prostitution and other lewd activity.6 55  Rejecting the
argument that the closure was a prior restraint,656 the Court found that
651 Id. at 470 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), and
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)).
652. See id.
653. See, eg., Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1992)
(upholding rules that allowed public library to expel homeless man because he often exhibited
offensive and disruptive behavior and his body odor was so offensive that library patrons could
not use certain portions of the library); E.W.A.P., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d
325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (defeating a prior restraint challenge by upholding an ordinance that
targets nuisance activities of an adult bookstore in light of evidence showing that 117 arrests
made in the previous two and one-half years were directly attributable to the presence of the
bookstore); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Bell, 677 N.E.2d 204, 206-07 (Mass.
1997) (upholding an injunction against an abortion protester based on common law public
nuisance grounds after making specific findings that the protester's tactics created a nuisance
that "disrupted the clinic's efforts to provide safe medical services and interfered with patients'
exercise of their right to abortion"); Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Allouwill Realty Corp.,
478 A.2d 1334 (Pa. Super. 1984) (upholding the closure of a bookstore under a public health
nuisance statute based on illicit activity); Commonwealth v. Croatan Books, Inc., 323 S.E.2d 86
(Va. 1984) (upholding the closure of a bookstore under a public health nuisance statute based
on illicit sexual activities occurring on the premises). But cf City of National City v. Wiener,
838 P.2d 223, 341 (Cal. 1992) (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating in
dissent that the majority had improperly upheld as constitutional a zoning ordinance regulating
adult entertainment establishments when such bookstore could have been abated as a common
law public nuisance).
654 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
655. See id at 704-07; see also O'Connor v. City and County of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210,
1216 (10th Cir. 1990) (relying on Arcara and holding that the city's action in response to public
nuisances "does not implicate or trigger First Amendment protections"). The closure order in
Arcara was a response to evidence obtained by an undercover investigation that found illegal
sexual activity on the bookstore premises and formed the basis of a civil complaint. See Arcara,
478 U.S. at 698.
656. See id. at 705-06. The Court noted that:
The closure order sought in this case differs from a prior restraint in two significant
respects. First, the order would impose no restraint at all on the dissemination of
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the regulation allowing the closure sanction was directed at unlawful
conduct that was not related to books or other expressive activity.
657
The Court stressed that "[b]ookselling in an establishment used for
prostitution does not confer First Amendment coverage to defeat a
valid statute aimed at penalizing and terminating illegal uses of
premises. 658
Even though the Arcara Court did not employ the prior restraint
doctrine, the decision illustrates this Article's proposal to use
common law nuisance to deal with actual harmful effects resulting
from potentially constitutionally protected activities. Rather than
zoning in advance to prohibit the adult bookstore, the county officials
used public nuisance law to address actual harmful effects
accompanying the protected activity of running a bookstore. Under a
nuisance balancing test that heavily weighs First Amendment rights,
it is conceivable that a court could find that a state's decision to shut
down an adult bookstore is not the least restrictive means of pursuing
its objectives and that a more favorable approach would involve
arresting the patron who is actually committing the illegal acts.
659
Sanctioning injunctive relief against known gang members also
was upheld as a valid application of public nuisance law in People ex
rel. Gallo v. Acuna 660 In Acuna, the California Supreme Court found
that the enjoined activity fell under California's statutory definition
of public nuisance, and that the provisions of the ordinance complied
with the constitutional standard that they "burden no more speech
particular materials, since respondents are free to carry on their bookselling business at
another location, even if such locations are difficult to find. Second, the closure order
sought would not be imposed on the basis of an advance determination that the
distribution of particular materials is prohibited-indeed, the imposition of the closure
order has nothing to do with any expressive conduct at all.
Id. at 705 n.2.
657. See id. at 707.
658. Id. Similarly, in Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993), the Supreme Court
upheld the use of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act's forfeiture provisions
to effectively shut down an adult entertainment business after a full criminal trial had
determined that some of the magazines and videotapes were obscene and that "the other
forfeited assets were directly linked to petitioner's commission of racketeering offenses." Id. at
552-53.
659. See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
660. 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
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than necessary to serve a significant governmental interest. ' 661 The
court observed that "there was sufficient evidence before the superior
court to support the conclusions that the gang and its members
present in Rocksprings were responsible for the public nuisance. 662
Thus, the court reconciled "the community's right to security and
protection ... with the individual's right to expressive and
associative freedom"" 3 by allowing the use of public nuisance
doctrine to maintain public order, while at the same time requiring
the government to prove that actual or imminent harm resulted from
the defendants' association. 6 4
While public nuisance actions are used by local officials to control
land use, private nuisance actions can also be an effective land use
tool, allowing private individuals to control adverse effects generated
by neighboring landowners. First Amendment rights must be taken
into consideration when either of these actions are used. As discussed
above, public nuisance actions that directly target imminent harm or
harm that already has occurred generally will be upheld against
claims of First Amendment violations. Private nuisance actions, and
requests for injunctive relief, also should be upheld if when a court
balances a defendant's First Amendment concerns with a plaintiffs
nuisance claim, the court determines that the defendant has interfered
unreasonably with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his or her
land. Private plaintiffs who can demonstrate that substantial harmful
effects are being generated by a defendant's protected activity are
particularly likely to prevail when the defendant's conduct involves
an expressive activity that garners a somewhat lower level of
protection, such as an adult use or commercial speech.
B. Nuisance as an Efficient Alternative to Zoning
Nuisance law can be an economically efficient replacement for
zoning regulation. Zoning is a method of prospectively locating uses
to reduce the impact of harmful effects generated by such uses.
66 5
661. Id. at 614 (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994)).
662. Id. at 618.
663. Id. at 603.
664. See id.
665. For example, single-family residential areas are considered sensitive uses that are
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Although prospectively locating these uses "reduce[s] the nuisance
costs that would occur if land uses were randomly distributed[,J ...
[u]rban land markets automatically reduce nuisance costs far below
the level that would be found with random land use distribution."
666
In his book, Land Use Without Zoning,667 Bernard H. Siegan
undertook and documented a study of the land use experience of
Houston, Texas-the only major city in the United States that has
never adopted zoning.668 Siegan postulated that studying Houston
"discloses what presently occurs in the nonzoned areas and what is
likely to occur in zoned areas if zoning were to be removed. 669
Arguing for the elimination of zoning, Siegan's study purports to
show that "the market offers protection to homeowners in the absence
of zoning, principally through restrictive covenants." 670 As stated
previously, this Article is not prepared to advocate eliminating all
zoning, but it does suggest that where zoning conflicts with First
Amendment rights, common law nuisance and private covenants671
can serve as viable alternatives to zoning regulation.
Professor Robert C. Ellickson, in his notable article on land use,
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls,672 concludes that "[t]he most prevalent systems
of land use control in the United States are neither as efficient nor as
equitable as available alternatives." 673 Urging the curtailment, and
possibly even the replacement, of zoning, Ellickson proposes
alternative systems of land use control such as nuisance law,
covenants, fines, and selected uniform mandatory standards that rely
on decentralized internalization devices to reduce the "potential for
clustered and located as far away as possible from more undesirable uses such as industrial
plants, highways, railroad tracks, and even apartment buildings.
666. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 693 (explaining that industrial plants are not attracted to
residential areas because they naturally will cluster along railroad tracks).
667. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972).
668. See id. at 23.
669. Id.
670. Id. at 231.
671. While private covenants are an excellent alternative for controlling land use, this
Article does not address this method for resolving First Amendment conflicts.
672. Ellickson, supra note 6.
673. Id. at 779.
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high prevention costs inherent in centralized approaches." 674
Ellickson took a reformulated approach to nuisance law to avoid the
doctrinal problems that have developed primarily as a result of
plaintiffs' insistence on injunctive relief.675 Under Ellickson's
approach, neighbors would enforce the law by initiating private
lawsuits to redress substantial injuries caused by nuisances. 676
Professor Ellickson proposes the following reformulation of nuisance
law to take into account administrative costs and fairness when
distributing property rights among neighboring landowners:
A landowner who intentionally carries out activities, or permits
natural conditions to develop, that are perceived as
unneighborly under contemporary community standards shall
be liable for all damages (measured by the diminution in the
market value of plaintiff's land plus bonuses for diminutions in
widely held subjective values) to all parties who are thereby
substantially injured, and continuation of the activity may be
enjoined by any party willing to compensate the landowner for
any losses he suffers from that injunction.677
Ellickson's reformulation of nuisance law would require that the
adjudicator take First Amendment concerns into account when
deciding whether the activities are "unneighborly under
contemporary community standards., 678 One possible shortcoming of
this approach is that such a standard may not sufficiently protect
minority interests from majoritarian rule.679 Professor Ellickson also
suggests that this land use reformulation should include a defense to a
nuisance action when the remedy violates fundamental liberties, such
as freedom of expression.680 This defense likely can be used for other
First Amendment violations, as illustrated in this Article's example of
674. Id. at 779-81.
675. For a detailed discussion on available remedies, see id. at 738-48.
676. See id. at 780.
677. Id. at 748.
678, Id.
679. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1934) (suggesting a
narrower scope of review and a stricter scrutiny when legislation on its face restricts or impacts
specifically delineated constitutional freedoms).
680. See Ellickson, supra note 6, at 74849.
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how to employ nuisance law in lieu of zoning regulation that affects
free exercise. 681 Professor Ellickson's article is an exceptional
analysis of the economic and fairness issues pertaining to zoning
regulation and alternative systems, such as private covenants and
nuisance law, and supports this Article's assertion that nuisance law
can be an efficient replacement for zoning regulation that conflicts
with First Amendment activities.
682
Other scholars and commentators also have suggested replacing
zoning regulation with alternative systems of land use control.683
Professor Douglas W. Kmiec proposed an alternative system to
zoning (less extreme than the approach of Siegan or Ellickson,
Kmiec's former professor) that retains public control in situations
where private decisions will not be able to reach an optimal result.
684
The use of nuisance law is an integral part of this alternative system,
which employs Professor Ellickson's suggested analysis that
characterizes a "system as efficient when it minimizes the sum of
nuisance, prevention, and administrative costs."685 Professor Kmiec's
alternative system uses nuisance law to remedy externalities or
spillovers that are imposed on neighbors, while de-emphasizing
injunctive relief to make its use more effective.686 Public regulation is
used to control safety and health issues, such as population density
and public improvements, while tasks such as regulating competition
and promoting aesthetic or social preferences are reserved for
nuisance law and private decision-making through covenants.687
In order to test the efficiency of nuisance law as a zoning
replacement, let us suppose that a Presbyterian church decides to
681. See infra notes 696-97 and accompanying text.
682. See infra notes 690-92 and accompanying text.
683. See, e.g., MARTIN A. GARRETT, JR., LAND USE REGULATION: THE IMPACTS OF
ALTERNATIVE LAND USE RIGHTS (1987); Kmiec, supra note 598; Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Abolish
Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719 (1980); Robert H. Nelson, Zoning Myth and Practice-
From Euclid into the Future, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP
(Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989); John M. Ross, Note, Land Use Control in
Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of Zoning and a Proposed Alternative, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 335
(1972); see also Radner, supra note 630, at 412 (proposing the use of nuisance law as the
"market" for allocating rights associated with electronic commercial speech).
684. See Kmiec, supra note 598, at 34.
685. Id. at 39.
686. See id. at 84.
687. See id. at 93.
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open a homeless shelter on its church campus in an affluent, single-
family residential neighborhood.688 We must presume that a church-
run homeless shelter is a religious use, protected by the Free Exercise
Clause.689 We will also assume that there are no private covenants
preventing such a use. A local zoning ordinance allows churches and
religious institutions as conditional uses in this hypothetical
residential neighborhood. The zoning ordinance defines "Church and
Religious Institutions" as "a building or set of buildings used for the
sole purpose of worship and customarily related activities," and it
further adds that "homeless shelters and food banks are not
'customarily related activities."' After the church's request for a
conditional use permit is denied, the church files suit and the court
invalidates the ordinance as a prior restraint on religious exercise
because it does not have the procedural safeguards required under
Freedman. The church then opens its homeless shelter and four
families occupy a portion of one of the church's buildings. One of the
families has a teenage son who is a member of a local gang. Several
of the gang members begin to "hang around" the church campus and
soon the neighborhood begins to experience increased litter, loud
noise and music late into the evening, minor graffiti, and even public
drinking and urination. Disturbed by the adverse effects generated,
albeit indirectly, by the shelter occupants, several neighbors join
together and file a private nuisance action to enjoin the operation of
the homeless shelter.
If the overall goal of land use control from an efficiency
standpoint is the minimization of the sum of nuisance costs,
prevention costs, and administrative costs, 690 then we must look at
688. This type of religious activity is becoming more prevalent as the level of
governmental resources devoted to feeding and sheltering the homeless has not kept up with the
demand for these charitable services. See, e.g., Orange Count Perspective; Finding the
Common Ground, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1997, at B8 (reporting that a judge sentenced Reverend
Wiley S. Drake to fifteen hundred hours of community service after a jury convicted him of
violating Buena Park zoning laws by sheltering homeless men, women, and children in a church
parking lot and patio).
689. See Shelley Ross Saxer, When Religion Becomes a Nuisance: Balancing Land Use
and Religious Freedom When Activities of Religious Institutions Bring Outsiders into the
Neighborhood, 84 KENTUCKY L.J. 507, 512-25 (1995-96) (discussing religious uses and
accessory uses).
690. See Ellickson, supra note 6, at 690.
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how these costs pertain to this scenario. First, nuisance costs include
harmful externalities, such as the gang member problems, that
decrease the utility and, therefore, the value of the neighborhood
property. Nuisance costs also include the costs to each homeowner to
monitor the harm to their property, the costs to associate with
neighbors to oppose the harm either through political lobbying or
litigation, the costs associated with neighbors exiting the community,
and the costs of litigation to challenge the operation of the shelter as a
nuisance. Despite such numerous nuisance costs, zoning, as an
alternative form of land use control, will not necessarily reduce the
aggregate sum of nuisance costs, prevention costs, and administrative
costs. This follows from the relatively high prevention and
administrative costs that inhere in zoning's centralized regulatory
approach.69' Moreover, if we take into consideration Bernard
Siegan's conclusion that the market mechanism in a nonzoning
system would allocate uses just as efficiently as zoning, then
nuisance law can serve as a superior tool for addressing those land
uses that interfere with other landowners' rights because "zoning
does not guarantee either elimination or internalization of nuisance
costs. 6 9 2
1. Nuisance Costs
In the above hypothetical, the church will have several incentives
to mitigate the effects of the gang-related activity, despite the absence
of potential liability under a pertinent zoning ordinance. The church
will have a strong incentive to confront the harmful effects created by
the shelter's resident gang member because members of the church
use the church campus for worship, bible study, youth meetings, and
social events. In addition, it will be important to the church to keep
its campus attractive so that visitors and potential new members will
be induced to attend church functions. Because churches frequently
draw their membership from the local community, it will also be
important to the church to maintain a positive relationship with its
surrounding neighborhood. Not all neighbors will share the belief
691. Seeid. at779-81.
692. Id. at 693-94 (discussing Siegan's study of nonzoning in Houston).
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held by church members that sheltering the homeless is a religiously
or socially desirable activity that must be conducted in the local
community. Therefore, the church must be cognizant of community
opposition to such activities and must be responsive to these concerns
in order to avoid drops in membership or litigation. The church may
be able to guard against community opposition by increasing
communication and education in the local community about its
socially responsible efforts. Finally, the threat of a potential nuisance
suit will also deter church officials from neglecting problems
generated by the shelter.
If the above incentives are not sufficient to prevent the gang-
related harms from occurring, the risk of loss from these external
harms will be placed on the church through common law nuisance.
Necessarily, as with any defendant in a nuisance action, a church
with limited financial resources may be "judgment proof' and unable
to compensate its neighbors for any harm caused by its activities.
However, if the church congregation wishes to remain in existence
and protect its existing assets, the threat of a nuisance suit ultimately
should deter it from using its facility in a way that unreasonably
harms neighboring landowners.
The social utility of the church's conduct in housing the homeless
may outweigh the shelter's harm to the nearby homeowners, so as to
preclude a court from issuing an injunction to close the shelter.
However, the effect of issuing an injunction against the church
shelter, which might involve placing four families on the street,
should not influence a court's decision as to whether the interference
is unreasonable and, therefore, a nuisance. The church should still be
responsible for the adverse social consequences of its religious
mission in the form of damages if the adverse effects rise to the level
of actionable nuisance.693
693. Professor Ronald Coase theorized that when parties are able to bargain without
transaction costs, the parties will reach an efficient outcome regardless of the parties' initial
rights or liabilities. See Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 245, 246 n.3 (1987) (citing Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1960)). Applying the Coase Theorem, with the assumption that administrative costs
are zero, if the cost to the church of closing its shelter is less than the neighbors' gains from the
elimination of adverse effects caused by the gang members, the church will close its shelter
regardless of how rights are distributed initially. The problem with this theorem, as Coase
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Employing Professor Ellickson's prima facie nuisance analysis,
the church is intentionally housing the homeless and permitting one
of its occupants to create adverse effects that, presumably, would be
perceived as unneighborly under contemporary community
standards. 694 The church should, therefore, be liable for all damages
to neighbors who live within close proximity to the church campus
and are affected by the visual blight, disturbances of the peace, and
property value reduction. Moreover, the neighbors may elect to
enjoin the operation of the shelter if they are willing to pay the
church for losses that it would suffer by closing the shelter.695
However, under the Ellickson analysis, the church would have a
defense that the remedy of forcing the shelter to close upon payment
from the residents would violate the church's fundamental liberty of
free exercise. 696 Allowing such a defense "serves as a useful reminder
that maximization of wealth and the assurance of its fair distribution
are not the sole social goals."
697
Assuming that a court would consider the hypothetical adverse
effects to be substantial, under the traditional nuisance analysis
outlined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts,698 the court would
need to balance several factors to determine whether or not the
interference with the church neighbors' use and enjoyment of their
property was unreasonable. The court would examine: (1) the extent
and character of the adverse effects on the neighbors; (2) the
suitability of an affluent residential neighborhood for the location of a
homeless shelter; (3) the social values of the church's conduct in
recognized in the application of his theorem to pollution problems, is that the high transaction
costs involved in bargaining with the many potential victims in the community would preclude
the use of this model of economic efficiency. See generally Coase, supra.
694. Residents in an affluent neighborhood do not expect that litter, noise, and unseemly
conduct will regularly occur, rather they expect that "the community should be beautiful as well
as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26,33 (1954).
695. In this case, the neighbors may have to compensate the church to help it relocate the
shelter to another location where the adverse effects would not be as severe, such as an
industrial area.
696. See Ellickson, supra note 6, at 748-50. Although Professor Ellickson specifies a
defense for freedom of expression, this author will assume that he intended that any of the First
Amendment liberties would qualify as a defense.
697. Id. at 750.
698. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS § 827 (1977).
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filling a need for private social responsibility and the neighbors' right
to live in a quiet and peaceful neighborhood; and (4) the burden on
the neighbors to avoid the harm and the church's ability to prevent
the harm. The fact that the church is exercising its First Amendment
right of free exercise should weigh in favor of allowing the church to
continue operating the homeless shelter. In addition, while the
adverse effects may be substantial enough to justify a finding of
nuisance that would require the church to pay damages or even close
the shelter, the church should be able to obviate such effects by
encouraging the destructive occupant to discontinue the offending
behavior, by removing the destructive occupant, or, if necessary, by
removing the destructive occupant's entire family from the shelter.
Moreover, the church should have an incentive to take these
preventive measures prior to resolving the dispute through litigation
because of the likelihood that a court in this circumstance would
determine that a nuisance exists.
2. Prevention Costs
Because economic efficiency is evaluated by determining whether
the sum of nuisance, prevention, and administrative costs is
minimized, it is necessary to look more closely at prevention costs.
Prevention costs include "nonadministrative expenditures made, or
opportunity costs incurred, by either a nuisance maker or his injured
neighbor to reduce the level of nuisance costs. ' 699 In our hypothetical,
the city attempted to eliminate homeless shelters operated by
churches or religious institutions in certain residential areas. If
homeless shelters were similarly banned in all areas, the nuisance
costs would be avoided, but the prevention costs could be high. The
homeless would incur prevention costs by being forced to suffer the
hardship of surviving without shelter. In addition the city would need
to find other solutions to the homeless problem, without the aid of
private religious organizations, in order to prevent the costs of crime
and urban blight that might result if the homeless are unable to obtain
shelter and care and are forced to live on the streets or in the parks.
699. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 688.
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Business owners also might incur prevention costs by bearing the
impact of reduced patronage caused by the homeless sleeping on
public sidewalks in front of their stores. Thus, "[p]revention costs in
this instance would probably far exceed the eliminated nuisance
costs, and overall efficiency would not be enhanced.9
700
3. Administrative Costs
Administrative costs include "both public and private costs of
getting information, negotiating, writing agreements and laws,
policing agreements and rules, and arranging for the execution of
preventive measures."70' Unlike most nuisance actions, a public land
use control system requires the expenditure of public funds for direct
and indirect costs such as salaries for zoning officials, volunteer labor
for zoning appeals boards and planning commissions, and general
governmental support costs. 702 In addition, developers may incur
private administrative costs when they investigate zoning restrictions
and attempt to obtain permits or amend zoning regulations. Similarly,
landowners may incur private administrative costs when they
organize local lobbies to oppose developers. Fees for the zoning
attorneys that assist in these activities may even exceed the direct
costs of running a public zoning agency.70 3 As Professor Ellickson
has observed, "[t]hese costs, when added to the high prevention costs
zoning is likely to involve, may be so great that an entire zoning
ordinance is inefficient; that is, the reduction in nuisance costs is less
than the concomitant prevention and administrative costs. ' '7°4 Thus,
using nuisance law to govern activities that implicate the First
Amendment would likely be an efficient and equitable alternative to
zoning regulation as a method of resolving land use conflicts.
The administrative costs of a zoning scheme, when added to
prevention costs and nuisance costs, cannot justify zoning away First
Amendment rights on the basis of economic efficiency. Zoning does
700. Id. at 689.
701. Id.
702. See id. at 697.
703. See id. at 697-98 (noting that "[b]y crude measurement zoning now produces almost
four times as many appellate opinions as nuisance and covenant law disputes combined").
704. Id. at 699.
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not guarantee that nuisance costs associated with First Amendment
activity will be reduced by locational decisions or decisions banning
offensive, but protected, First Amendment activities. Prevention
costs, such as dealing with the homeless problem, will be borne by
others in the community if religious institutions are restricted from
helping. Although nuisance costs generated by housing the homeless
may be reduced by regulating and restricting these uses in advance,
the sum of nuisance costs, prevention costs, and administrative costs
under a zoning scheme will likely exceed nuisance costs under a
scheme that restricts zoning regulation of First Amendment activities.
Therefore, common law nuisance, which requires a case-by-case
examination of competing interests when adverse effects actually
occur, will be a more efficient land use approach than zoning
regulation which may restrict First Amendment rights. Most
importantly, common law nuisance will allow the call for First
Amendment individual freedoms to be heard above the voice of the
majority.
VII. CONCLUSION
First Amendment rights are precious to our society and should be
preserved, even when protecting them means sacrificing some degree
of our "quality of life" expectations. Land use regulations, either in
the form of a general ordinance or a conditional use permit scheme,
have the potential to impermissibly restrict protected speech,
expression, religious exercise, and associational rights. This Article
has proposed that courts should apply a consistent constitutional
policy against zoning actions that potentially restrict any First
Amendment freedom. A land use regulation that burdens any of the
rights protected under the First Amendment should be treated as a
prior restraint. Regulations that are a prior restraint should be valid
only if they: (1) fall into one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the
prohibition, such as military secrets, obscenity, or incitements to acts
of violence; (2) prevent direct, immediate and irreparable damage; (3)
are the least restrictive means of doing so; and (4) meet the Freedman
procedural safeguards against official censorship.
If a land use regulation that affects First Amendment rights
survives the heavy presumption against constitutionality, it must then
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be evaluated as either a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
Zoning regulations that are content-based, or that target the exercise
of a First Amendment right, must be evaluated using a strict scrutiny
standard, requiring a compelling government interest that cannot be
achieved by a less restrictive means. A regulation that targets
religious belief should continue to be absolutely prohibited, and a
content-based regulation that targets a particular religious practice
should be subject to the strict scrutiny standard.
Content-neutral regulation should be examined under a lesser
level of scrutiny as a time, place, and manner restriction. The O'Brien
test, currently used to evaluate content-neutral regulation of protected
speech, should be used to evaluate content-neutral restrictions on
protected speech, expression, religious exercise, and associational
rights. Courts should apply the Central Hudson four-prong test, along
with the Fox narrow-tailoring standard, to content-neutral land use
regulation of commercial speech. In addition, courts should discard
the Renton "secondary effects" analysis as an impermissible attempt
to allow content-based restrictions to masquerade as content-neutral
regulation.
Free exercise deserves at least as much, if not more, protection
from restrictive government land use regulation as is enjoyed by adult
uses and commercial speech. The use of the O'Brien test as an
intermediate scrutiny standard for content-neutral regulation of
religious beliefs or practices will offer less protection to religious
exercise than the SherbertlYoder compelling interest test, but it will
require a greater level of scrutiny than currently is required under the
Smith rational basis test. However, because it is unlikely that prior
restraints on religious exercise will survive scrutiny, courts will
invalidate most restrictions before it is even necessary to decide
whether they are content-based or content-neutral.
If a land use regulation directed against the adverse "secondary
effects" generated by the exercise of a First Amendment right is
invalid as a prior restraint, the community is not without a remedy for
abating any actual adverse effects that do occur. Communities may
use common law nuisance claims to resolve such land use conflicts
between First Amendment rights and the police power to regulate for
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the public health, safety, and welfare of the community. Resting on
the ancient legal maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, 5
nuisance is an efficient means of land use control that will adequately
address community needs when unrestrained regulation of First
Amendment freedoms is no longer permitted.
"[O]nly a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject
within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting
First Amendment freedoms.,,7°6 Protecting residential areas from the
undesirable effects of certain uses that might be perceived as
detrimental to residential land use is not a sufficiently compelling
government interest to justify the restriction of First Amendment
rights. First Amendment rights occupy a higher position in our
society than a state or local government's exercise of police power to
promote the general health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.
Protecting First Amendment rights can be reconciled with exercising
police power by resurrecting two, sometimes forgotten and
sometimes scorned, principles: the concept of prior restraint and the
common law of nuisance.
705. This phrase essentially means that "every person should so use his own property as
not to injure that of another." Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953).
706. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963).
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